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ABSTRACT. While scholars have identified the growth of litigation finance in cases ranging
from personal injury to securities fraud, none have examined the recent growth of alternative
litigation finance in qui tam (whistleblower) claims. To the extent that the False Claims Act
privatizes the enforcement of law, the participation of hedge funds and financial entities in qui
tam actions has serious implications for our prosecutorial system. This Note addresses those
implications.
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LITIGATION FINANCE IN DOJ WHISTLEBLOWER SUITS
INTRODUCTION
The False Claims Act (FCA) is the "government's primary litigation tool
for recovering losses sustained as the result of fraud."' In 2012 alone, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) recovered nearly five billion dollars in settlements
and judgments under the statute.' The agency did not work singlehandedly in
the majority of these recoveries. Through a mechanism called "qui tam"
actions, the FCA authorizes individuals to bring civil suits on behalf of the
federal government.' In return, these "private attorneys general," known as
"relators," share in the monetary recovery of the lawsuit.4
The FCA's controversial qui tam provision has been the subject of extensive
scholarship.s Nonetheless, a significant development has gone largely
unnoticed: the increasing participation of third-party litigation finance in qui
tam claims. Alternative litigation finance (ALF) refers to the practice of third
parties financing lawsuits in exchange for a portion of the payout. Although
scholars have identified the growth of ALF in cases ranging from personal
injury to securities fraud," none have examined the implications of third-party
financing in qui tam claims. To the extent that qui tam suits privatize the
1. United States ex rel. Marcy v. Rowan Cos., 520 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2oo8); see also Avco
Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("The False Claims Act is
the government's primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as the result of
fraud against the government.").
2. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Nearly $5 Billion in False
Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2012 (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2o2
/December/12-ag-1439.html.
3. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012).
4. United Seniors Ass'n v. Philip Morris USA, Soo F. 3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2007); see 31 U.S.C.
S 3730(d).
5. See, e.g., Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui Tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members Have
Standing to File Qui Tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 PUB. CONT. L.J. 45 (2004)
(arguing that federal employees and military service members have standing to sue under
the FCA); Christina Orsini Broderick, Note, Qui Tam Provisions and the Public Interest: An
Empirical Analysis, 107 COLUM. L. REv. 949 (2007) (analyzing the costs and benefits of the
FCA through empirical data); Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui Tam
Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341 (1989) (examining the constitutional implications of qui tam
actions).
6. The term ALF was originally coined by Steven Garber of the Rand Institute. See Steven
Garber, Alternative Litigation Financing in the United States: Issues, Knowns, and Unknowns,
RAND INST. FOR Cwv. JUST. (2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs
/occasional-papers/2olo/RANDOP3o6.pdf.
7. Courtney R. Barksdale, All that Glitters Isn't Gold: Analyzing the Costs and Benefits ofLitigation
Finance, 26 REv. LITIG. 707, 715 (2007).
2425
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
enforcement of law, the participation of hedge funds and financial entities in
such actions has serious implications for our prosecutorial system.
This Note argues that ALF has the potential to dramatically decrease the
amount of fraud committed against the federal government. The reason relates
to how the DOJ investigates and prosecutes fraud claims. As envisioned by the
Act, the DOJ has primary responsibility for prosecuting FCA claims.
Nonetheless, budgetary restraints are forcing the agency to outsource this task
to relators and their counsel.' Given the enormous costs and significant length
of qui tam cases,'o relators and their attorneys will increasingly need financing.
ALF entities can fill this gap and ensure that legitimate fraud claims are not
ignored for lack of resources.
Despite this potential, investors in qui tam suits face a significant
challenge: discovery. Several federal courts have held that ALF entities and
recipients may not exchange privileged information without waiving
protection from disclosure. Absent such protection, relators are unlikely to
provide ALF entities with the information necessary for financiers to vet
claims. As a result, ALF entities are unlikely to invest in qui tam actions.
This Note argues that ALF entities and relators may qualify for a common
law exception to waiver. In particular, it appears that relators and financiers can
likely demonstrate that they share a "common interest" in the litigation. This
Note therefore proposes three strategies for doing so. First, courts have long
protected exchanges of privileged information between relators and the
Department of Justice. Since protecting exchanges between financiers and
relators serves many of the same policy interests, ALF entities can cite case law
8. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-o6-32oR, INFORMATION ON FALSE CLAIMS
LITIGATION 2 (20o6), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/do632or.pdf ("Under the FCA, the
federal government has primary responsibility for prosecuting a qui tam case and it is at the
DOJ's discretion to involve the relator on a case-by-case basis.").
9. See, e.g., Robert Fabrikant & Nkechinyem Nwabuzor, In the Shadow of the False Claims Act:
"Outsourcing" the Investigation by Government Counsel to Relator Counsel During the Seal
Period, 83 N.D. L. REv. 837, 852 (2007); Suzanne Durrell, The Relator's Role in False Claims
Act Investigations: Towards a New Paradigm, DuRRELL L. OFF. 6-14 (2012),
http://www.thomasandassoc.net/Articles/FCA-Investigations-Relators-Role-FINAL-04-25
-12.pdf; D. Grayson Yeargin & Conor S. Harris, Government's Increased Use ofNoncommittal
Intervention Filings Complicates Qui Tam Proceedings Under the False Claims Act, NIXON
PEABODY LLP (Apr. 18, 2013), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/156465_GIWCAlert
QuiTam ProceeduralDevelopments_18APR2o3.pdf.
10. Suits can take as long as nine years. See Press Release, P&C's Glaxo Whistleblower Case
Accounts for $1.5 Billion Out of Glaxo's Record $3 Billion Settlement, PHIILIPS & COHEN LLP
(July 2, 2012), http://www.phillipsandcohen.com/P-C-News/Whistleblowers-played-major
-role-in-Glaxo-case-leading-to-Glaxo-s-record-settlement.shtml (announcing the 2012
settlement of a qui tam case filed in 2003).
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concerning the DOJ to argue against waiver. Second, through a quirk of qui
tam law, relators can turn financiers into fellow whistleblowers by giving them
non-privileged information about the fraud. As co-relators, co-parties in
interest, and potential co-plaintiffs in the qui tam suit, the relator and ALF
entity would likely share a common interest sufficient to prevent waiver. Third,
relators can make revocable, gratuitous partial assignments of their claims to
ALF entities. As co-owners in the qui tam claims, relators and ALF entities
would likely share a common interest in the suit. Additionally, since the partial
assignment is gratuitous (and therefore revocable), whistleblowers can
terminate the assignment should ALF entities decline to fund the case.
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I provides background on ALF and
qui tam actions and documents ALF entities' recent but growing practice of
financing qui tam claims. Part II suggests that ALF could substantially improve
the DOJ's efforts to combat fraud by providing resources to whistleblowers
and signaling which cases have merit. Part III analyzes how courts have
addressed exchanges of privileged information between ALF entities and
recipients and the challenges that ALF entities face in proving common
interest. Part IV then proposes three solutions to this dilemma by utilizing case
law concerning the DOJ and the doctrine of partial assignment. Finally, Part V
responds to the potential public policy concerns of permitting third parties to
finance suits made on behalf of the government.
I. THE RISE OF ALF AND OUI TAM ACTIONS
Alternative litigation finance "refers to the funding of litigation activities by
entities other than the parties themselves, their counsel, or other entities with a
preexisting contractual relationship with one of the parties, such as an
indemnitor or a liability insurer."" Although widespread in Australia and
England," litigation finance has been slow to develop in the United States due
to common-law prohibitions on third-party financing." The most important of
these prohibitions is the bar against champerty, defined as "maintaining a suit
in return for a financial interest in the outcome."' 4 The justification for this ban
11. ANTHONY SEBOK & W. BRADLEY WENDEL, N.Y.C. BAR, 2013 04 15P NYCBAR go, BORROWING
FROM PETER TO SUE PAUL: LEGAL & ETHICAL ISSUES IN FINANCING A COMMERCIAL LAwsuIT
§ 1 (2013).
i2. See Nicholas Dietsch, Litigation Financing in the U.S., the U.K., and Australia: How the
Industry Has Evolved in Three Countries, 38 N. KY. L. REv. 687, 699, 703 (2011).
3. See SEBOK &WENDEL, Supra note 11, § III.B.L.a.
14- Id.
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stemmed from the belief that "third-party funding of litigation encouraged
fraudulent lawsuits.""s Over the past decade, American courts have relaxed
these restrictions,'6 and as a result, litigation finance has rapidly grown.17 That
growth has also not gone unnoticed. The American Bar Association, '8 law
journals," state bar ethics committees, 2o and even the popular press have
commented on the rise of ALF entities.
As ALF has grown, so too has its target audience. Presently, financiers loan
money to both attorneys and plaintiffs. For attorneys, the contributions
ordinarily go toward overhead, operational expenses, and litigation costs.22 For
plaintiffs, the funds often "cover their personal expenses while awaiting
settlement or judgment."2 ' Typically, these loans are non-recourse, and in
return, ALF entities receive a percentage of the recovery.2
ALF is also expanding into new categories of claims. So far, commentators
have identified two types of litigation.2s The traditional category, "consumer
funding," involves relatively small personal claims related to personal injury26
15. Id.
16. See id. S III.B.i.b (discussing the trend toward abandoning common law prohibitions on
champerty in the United States).
17. See Jennifer Smith, Investors Put Up Millions of Dollars to Fund Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7,
2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo1424127887323820304578408794155816934.
is. See SEBOK & WENDEL, supra note ii.
ig. See, e.g., Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95
MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Barksdale, supra note 7.
20. See, e.g., Comm. on Profl Ethics, Opinion #769: Representing Client in Transaction with Entity
Proposing to Lend Against Litigation Proceeds, N.Y. ST. B. Ass'N (Nov. 4, 2003), http://
www.nysba.org/CustomTemplates/Content.aspx?id=54o9; Comm. on Profl & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Opinion 2on-2: Third Party Litigation Financing, N.Y.C. B. AsS'N (June 2011),
http://www.nycbar.org/ethics/ethics-opinions-local/2o1l-opinions/1159-formal-opinion
-2011-02; Ethics Comm., Ethics Opinion KBA E-432, Ky. B. Ass'N (May 20, 2011),
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics-opinions/kba-e-432.pdf.
21. See, e.g., Vanessa O'Connell, Funds Spring Up to Invest in High-Stakes Litigation, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 3, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SBooo1424o529702o4226245765988423
18233996; Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, CNNMoNEY: FORTUNE
(June 28, 2011, 2:06 PM), http://features.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2o11/o6/28/have-you-got
-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit.
22. Barksdale, supra note 7, at 708.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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and employment discrimination." The newer category, "commercial funding,"
involves business disputes, such as intellectual property, antitrust, business
contracts, and international commercial and investment arbitration. These
disputes are typically brought by sophisticated parties and for large sums of
money. For example, in 2010, one of the largest ALF entities (Burford) agreed
to finance Ecuadorian claimants in a multi-billion dollar dispute with
Chevron." The claimants' attorneys, including lead attorney Steven Donziger,
received fifteen million dollars to continue litigating the suit.29
Litigation finance has not been the only burgeoning legal field in the last
decade. Like ALF, qui tam actions have also recently risen to prominence. This
newfound growth belies the actions' old age. The False Claims Act, which
establishes qui tam enforcement, was originally enacted during the Civil War
to deter fraud by defense contractors.3O For the next century, the FCA remained
relatively toothless until Congress amended the Act in 1986." Those
amendments imposed civil and criminal" liability upon "[a]ny person" who
"knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for
payment or approval."" The punishment is also significant- treble damages
and a civil penalty of up to ten thousand dollars per claim. 4
The FCA's qui tam procedure begins when a private person (the relator)
brings a civil action "for the person and for the United States Government"
against the alleged false claimant.35 To initiate the action, the relator delivers a
copy of the complaint and any supporting evidence to the government, 3 which
27. See Barksdale, supra note 7, at 715.
z8. Steinitz, supra note 25, at 466-67.
ag. Id. at 467.
30. Michael J. Davidson, Applying the False Claims Act to Commercial IT Procurements, 34 PUB.
CONT. L.J. 25, 26 (2004).
31. See ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 248 (4 th Cir. 2011) ("The 1986 Amendments expanded
the FCA's scope, increased the penalties, lowered the requisite standard of knowledge and
intent, revised the process for a qui tam relator to file suit, and expanded the number of qui
tam relators permitted to sue.").
32. Criminal sanctions are available under 18 U.S.C. 5 287 (2012), which allows for punishment
of up to five years in prison and a fine calculated under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines. Qui tam relators, however, are unable to bring criminal cases. CHARLES DOYLE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40785, Qui TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL
STATUTES 23 (2009).
33. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2012).
34. Id.
3s. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
36. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
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then has sixty days to intervene in the action. If the government intervenes, it
assumes primary responsibility for prosecuting the action.38 If the government
declines to intervene within the sixty-day period, the relator has the exclusive
right to conduct the action,"3 and the government may subsequently intervene
only on a showing of "good cause." 4o Regardless of the DOJ's intervention
decision, the relator is entitled to a court hearing prior to the DOJ's dismissal
of the suit,4' and to a court determination of reasonableness prior to the DOJ's
settlement of the action.42
The relator also receives a share of any proceeds from the action. By statute,
this share ranges from fifteen to twenty-five percent if the government
intervenes, and from twenty-five to thirty percent if the government does
not-plus attorney's fees and costs.43 Although the DOJ has promulgated
internal guidelines outlining factors supporting a higher or lower share of the
recovery," it is ultimately the court's responsibility to determine what is
reasonable.4 1
Despite the simultaneous rise of qui tam and litigation finance over the last
decade, it appears that financiers have only recently begun investing in qui tam
suits. In May 2010, the New York Times ran one of the first reports on this
development.46 As the Times reported, "[w]hile the market in whistle-blower
futures is in its infancy," "hedge funds, private equity groups and other big
investors are . . . agreeing to buy a percentage of those future payouts in
37. Id. 5 3730(b)(2), (4).
38. Id. § 3730(c)(1).
39. Id. § 3730(b)(4).
40. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
41. Dismissal prevents a relator from carrying out the action on his or her own and is distinct
from declining to intervene. While there is judicial review of the former decision, there is
none for the latter. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A)-(B), (c)(3).
42. Id. 5 3730(c)(2).
43. Id. § 3 7 3 0(d)(1)-(2).
44. See United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1333-34
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (discussing the level of deference courts afford to the DOJ guidelines).
45. See United States ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 2d 78, 84 (D.D.C.
2012) ("While these Guidelines are not official federal regulations, and therefore not binding
on the Court, they are often considered when district courts are deciding on the appropriate
percentage of the proceeds to give a relator in an FCA case."), appeal dismissed, No. 12-5215,
2012 WL 3062466 (D.C. Cir. July 13, 2012).
46. David Kocieniewski, Whistle-Blowers Become Investment Option for Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES,
May 19, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2olo/o5/2o/business/2owhistleblower.html.
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exchange for a smaller amount upfront to the whistle-blowers."4 In turn,
whistleblowers are eager to sell, as they would otherwise "wait years to get
their share of any reward."*4 Although the expos6 primarily focused on the
third-party financing of the IRS's whistleblower program, the Times also noted
the presence of such ALF entities in "whistle-blower cases against government
contractors" -that is, FCA qui tam actions."
Six months later, a leading European academic association, the Royal
Society of Chemistryso released another publication detailing financiers'
growing interest in qui tam suits.5 ' As the article noted, "Hedge fund managers
say that US whistleblower lawsuits filed against drug companies could provide
attractive investment opportunities. . . . [F]ailure to pay is unlikely [and] legal
settlements do not correlate with market movements."52 Given the outsized
settlements involved with such cases-recently as much as three billion
dollarsss-the returns for investors can be enormous. Thus, as one investor
disclosed, "The investment community is already looking at those kinds of
opportunities."s4
Curiously, since January 2011, it does not appear that any other major
periodical has written about ALF in qui tam suits. Nonetheless, the
development has not been lost on investors. In October 2011, Australia's largest
finance company, IMF Ltd., launched its New York subsidiary-Bentham
Capital Ltd. Among the suits that Bentham has announced it will pursue: qui
tam actions.55
The field of qui tam funding is not for hedge funds alone. A simple Google




5o. About Us, ROYAL Soc'Y CHEMISTRY, http://www.rsc.org/aboutus (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
51. Andrew Turley, Funding Pharma Whistleblowers, RoYAL Soc'Y CHEMISTRY (Jan. 4, 2011),
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2o/January/040oilol.asp.
52. Id.
ss. Office of Pub. Affairs, GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud
Allegations and Failure to Report Safety Data, U.S. DEP'T JUST. (July 2, 2012), http://www
.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html.
54. Turley, supra note 51.
5. Nate Raymond, Top Australian Litigation Finance Company Opens New York Subsidiary, Am.
LAw. (Oct. 1o, 20n1), reprinted at http://www.benthamimf.com/docs/default-document
-library/top-australian-litigation-finance-company-opens-new-york-subsidiary.pdf
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suits.56 As these developments make clear, the market for litigation financing in
qui tam suits is rapidly accelerating. The only field that has failed to keep up
with the development is the legal literature.
II. LITIGATION FINANCE CAN SIGNIFICANTLY AID THE DOJ'S FIGHT
AGAINST FRAUD
The demand for litigation finance is not for relators alone. Changes in how
the DOJ prosecutes actions are rapidly raising costs for qui tam firms. As
originally envisioned by Congress, a qui tam complaint remains under seal for
sixty days upon filing, during which time the DOJ investigates and decides
whether to intervene.s7 In turn, the seal provisions limit the relator from
publicly discussing the filing of the qui tam complaint but not the existence of
the fraud."
Although Congress intended for the DOJ to quickly investigate and decide
whether to intervene in actions,s9 the agency's limited resources are
increasingly widening the gap between aspiration and reality. The DOJ may for
"good cause" move the court for extensions of the seal period,o and it appears
that the agency has aggressively used its discretion to do so. As of January 2011,
1,341 qui tam cases remained under seal. 6 1 For cases filed since October 1, 2006,
56. GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/#q="qui+tam"+funding (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
Examples include the Anglo-American Legal Finance Group, P&T Financial, Paul Sherman,
Excalibur Funding Programs, LightHouse Legal Finance, US Claims, LawAdvance,
CaseFunding, Law Max Legal Finance, and Lawsuit Financial Corp.
s7. See JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QuI TAM ACTIONS § 4.o4[B] (4 th ed. 2013)
(noting that the seal provision's "primary purpose was to allow the government to ascertain
privately 'whether it was already investigating the claims stated in the suit and then to
consider whether it wished to intervene"' (quoting Erickson ex rel. United States v. Am.
Inst. of Biological Scis., 716 F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1989))).
58. ACLU v. Holder, 673 F.3d 245, 254 (4th Cir. 2011); see United States ex rel Lujan v. Hughes
Aircraft Co., 67 F-3d 242, 244 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the relator "clearly violated the
seal provision of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) by making statements to the LosAngeles Times about
the existence and nature of her qui tam suit").
s9. See BOESE, supra note 57, § 4.o4[B] [2] ("The government must substantiate any claims of
'good cause' before an extension may be granted. In its consideration of what constitutes
'good cause,' Congress specifically rejected justifications such as the prosecutor's workload
or the mere existence of a criminal investigation.").
6o. Id. § 4.04.
61. John T. Bentivoglio et al., False Claims Act Investigations: Time for a New Approach?,
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the average wait time was thirteen months.62 That is more than six times the
period envisioned by Congress.
During these months, complaints do not sit idly. Qui tam firms have a
strong interest in convincing the DOJ to intervene. Should the DOJ agree to do
so, the agency takes primary responsibility over the action.' Likewise, the DOJ
has an interest in receiving a fully investigated and developed case, at which
point the government can make an informed intervention decision without
expending valuable resources. Thus, the DOJ has turned to relator's counsel to
push investigations forward during the seal period. During this time, relator's
counsel
conducts factual and legal research, drafts and reviews government
letters to defense counsel, drafts and reviews internal government
position papers, drafts and reviews government mediation briefs and
presentations, participates in interviewing fact witnesses, and,
unbeknownst to the defense, takes over responsibility for paying and
preparing the government's expert witnesses, supplying paralegals and
other clerical help to the government, and reviewing documents
produced by defendants (including documents produced under
compulsion).6
Moreover, legal practitioners predict that the number of cases in which the
DOJ "outsources" investigation will accelerate as qui tam filings increase each
year.6s As part of this trend, defense attorneys have recently noted another
change in DOJ policy: "unsealing cases with a notice that [the agency] will not
intervene 'at this time."' 66 Thus, under the DOJ's new approach, qui tam firms
will be expected to press cases forward into discovery and shoulder the costs,
with the hope that the DOJ will eventually take the lead.
62. Id.
63. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2012).
64. Fabrikant & Nwabuzor, supra note 9, at 843; see Durrell, supra note 9, at 8-14 (noting that
relator's counsel plays a role in preserving and producing evidence, drafting subpoenas and
interrogatories, reviewing documents and screening for privilege, locating and identifying
potential witnesses, obtaining and assessing witness testimony, and retaining expert
witnesses and consultants).
65. See Bentivoglio et al., supra note 61 ("We predict that there will be an increase in the number
of cases where the government delays an intervention decision, and the litigation is pushed
forward by the whistleblower and his/her attorney.").
66. Yeargin & Harris, supra note 9, at 2.
67. Id.
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These costs are often significant. Presently, qui tam firms frequently spend
millions on pre-discovery investigations. Adding discovery would
dramatically inflate those figures.6 9 Qui tam suits often involve allegations of
thousands of false claims, by over a hundred defendants, and across dozens of
states. 7o Furthermore, legal practitioners have noted that discovery in qui tam
suits is particularly vitriolic, with both sides using the process to bolster or to
attack the other.71 The result is often years of expensive disputes over
document production and depositions.
The FCA's fee-shifting provisions, which require defendants to pay
prevailing plaintiffs their attorney's fees, are unlikely to address these costs."
Qui tam suits can take nearly a decade before a payout -leaving firms strapped
for financing in the meantime.' Likewise, specialization is likely to exacerbate
68. See, e.g., Bagley v. United States, No. CV 10-00483-RT, 2013 WL 4007774, at *i (C.D. Cal.
Aug. 5, 2013) (noting that the DOJ paid the relator $9,407,295 in statutory attorney's fees
following settlement of the case); Miller v. Holzmann, 575 F. Supp. 2d 2, 59 (D.D.C. 2008)
(finding attorney's fees were $7,245,169.07); United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum
Health Grp., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1330 n.25 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that attorney's
fees were $2.7 million); United States v. Gen. Elec., 8o8 F. Supp. 584, 585 (S.D. Ohio 1992)
(finding attorney's fees were $2,416,464.75)-
69. To be sure, the number of qui tam complaints filed with the DOJ has increased over the
years, despite the DOJ's practice of outsourcing investigations. But this trend does not
disprove the claim that lack of funding for qui tam firms will deter investigation of
legitimate suits. Filing a complaint requires relatively little investigation (and relatively little
cost). Once the DOJ shows preliminary interest, however, relators and their counsel must
investigate the claims to the agency's satisfaction. Thus, even if the absolute number of
claims filed with the DOJ is still increasing, the number of filed claims turning into
investigated claims is likely to decrease. See JOHN E. CLARK, No2CFCB ABA-LGLED I-1,
ETHICS ISSUES IN QuI TAM LITIGATION: SOME THOUGHTS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF A
RELATOR'S COUNSEL (2001) (noting that while prudent counsel will fully investigate claims
before filing, firms will often file without investigating in order to ensure that they are not
precluded by the FCA's first-to-file bar).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Baylor Univ. Med. Ctr., 469 F.3d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting
that the relator filed its complaint against 132 hospitals across thirty states); United States ex
rel. Ven-A-Care v. Actavis Mid Ad. LLC, 659 F. Supp. 2d 262, 271 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying
motion to dismiss where the qui tam relator's complaint alleged that pharmaceutical
companies had filed tens of thousands of fraudulent Medicaid claims).
71. Marc S. Raspanti & Meredith S. Auten, Why Is Qui Tam Litigation So Dfficult to Resolve?,
15 AHLA CONNECTIONS 22-24 (Sept. 2011), http://www.falseclaimsact.com/wp-content
/uploads/2o13/o2/feature-sept2oii.pdf.
72. Id. at 24.
73. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2012).
74. See, e.g., Fast Facts, TAXPAYERS AGAINST FRAUD EDUC. FUND, https://www.taf.org/general
-resources/fast-facts (last visited Jan. 29, 2014) (noting that litigation against Columbia-
HCA lasted nearly thirteen years and required more than eighty-five thousand hours from
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these liquidity problems. Data suggest that firms working heavily on qui tam
actions account for over a third of complaints filed with the DOJ." This
specialization, in turn, means that qui tam firms often lack other litigation
practices that would ensure short-term financing (such as commercial
disputes). Thus, while there is no publicly available information on qui tam
firms' leverage, these firms will likely feel a significant squeeze on their
monetary reserves.
Smaller qui tam offices will have the greatest difficulty shouldering this
burden.71 Even if such firms do have financial reservoirs, a significant increase
in cost will likely force qui tam counsel to devote more resources to each case
and to investigate fewer cases overall. This could potentially lead to
meritorious suits being ignored for lack of money. In short, qui tam firms will
likely face serious financial pressures into the future. This creates a unique
situation in which third-party financiers are entering a market where both
counsel and their clients are increasingly in need of resources. As the rest of this
Part demonstrates, whether ALF increases the number of weak suits filed with
the DOJ depends on whether qui tam firms and financiers properly vet claims.
A. Qui Tam Firms Are Moderately Effective at Screening Claims
ALF entities do not receive funding requests in a vacuum. Instead, relators
reach financiers after convincing qui tam counsel to take the case. In turn, if qui
tam firms can successfully predict a complaint's probability of success, ALF
entities' due diligence is less important.
Qui tam counsel's predictive powers, however, appear to be limited. The
DOJ has declined to intervene in the majority of qui tam actions- seventy-
eight percent of cases between 1987 and 2004.' Additionally, if the DOJ
intervenes primarily in strong cases, then a low intervention rate indicates a
the lead law firm); Press Release, supra note io (describing litigation lasting nine years
before settlement).
7S. See David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui
Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 1244, 1299 tbl.4 (2012) (finding that firms that have filed
over ten qui tam cases account for 1,613 of the 4,326 claims filed with the DOJ).
76. Additionally, specialization by qui tam firms is positively correlated with DOJ intervention
rates. Id. It therefore appears that qui tam firms are more effective at screening and
investigating cases than more diversified firms. Thus, even if more diversified firms would
be less squeezed by an increase in costs, these firms are likely a less effective substitute for
specialized firms.
77. Broderick, supra note 5, at 971.
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high level of weak claims .78 Thus, as one critic of qui tam actions has
concluded, "Data on the disposition of false claims actions . . . indicate that the
number of frivolous suits is high."79
Despite these statistics, low levels of DOJ intervention do not necessarily
signal a large number of weak claims. The statistics fail to account for decisions
not to intervene where relators adequately alleged fraud but were barred from
bringing suit because another relator filed firstso or the relator's allegations had
already been publicly disclosed."' Similarly, there is also some evidence that the
DOJ relies on a variety of factors (other than the actual existence of fraud) in
determining whether to intervene, including "the harm of the offense, the
precedential value of the case, the defendant's liability under other statutes,
,,8,
agency resources, and perhaps political sensitivities.
Despite these considerations, qui tam counsel appear to file at least a
moderate number of weak complaints with the DOJ. If the DOJ regularly
declined legitimate claims, qui tam firms should be relatively successful
bringing the suits on their own. Nonetheless, between 1987 and 2004, courts
dismissed ninety-two percent (2,384) of these privately brought suits." Of
course, many of these complaints were likely dismissed for the same reason
that the DOJ declined to intervene: the first-to-file bar or the public disclosure
bar. However, it is unlikely that these jurisdictional bars account for the whole
of the dismissed suits. Thus, it appears that the DOJ is primarily declining
suits because the relator has failed to adequately allege fraud, and courts are
dismissing suits for the same reason. Given the significant number of DOJ-
declined cases and the remarkable lack of success of such cases, there appears to




8o. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (5) (2012).
81. See id. § 3730(e)(4) (A).
82. See David Kwok, Evidence from the False Claims Act: Does Private Enforcement Attract Excessive
Litigation?, 42 PUB. CONT. L.J. 225, 236 (2013); Tara L. Ward, Note, Amending the Qui Tam
Intervention Provisions: Setting Debar Higher?, 38 PUB. CONT. L.J. 297, 3o8-o9 (20o8); see also
U.S. Gov'T AccouNTABIuTY OFFICE, supra note 8, at 22 ("Many factors could affect the
government-relator relationship, such as the amount of information the relator possesses
about the potential fraud, the degree of experience possessed by the relator's counsel, the
existence of a criminal investigation and other issues involving sensitivity of data, such as
privacy or national security, and interpersonal dynamics between the relator and
defendant.").
83. Broderick, supra note 5, at 974. This figure does not include cases that were still active.
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B. The Degree ofDue Diligence Conducted by the ALF Industry as a Whole Is
Unclear
As with qui tam firms, the vetting procedures employed by the ALF
industry as a whole are unclear. Funders have argued that the quickest road to
bankruptcy is funding suits without a reasonable chance of success. At least
four particularly established financiers have taken this to heart, as
demonstrated by the extensive due diligence process detailed in their public
statements.8s
These four funders generally engage in a two-stage process of due diligence
that begins with in-house counsel and ends with third-party counsel. The
vetting procedures vary somewhat between each of the four firms, and each
entity prioritizes different factors when estimating the value of a claim. These
factors include:
* the claim's likelihood of success (based on the facts of the case and
the relevant legal precedent);
* the potential value of a claim following adjudication;
* the ability to collect (based on the enforceability of an ultimate
award and the financial condition of the defendant);
* the likely cost of litigating the claim;
* the estimated length of time to get through trial and final
judgment (including the likelihood of appeal); and
84. JONATHAN MOLOT, TSUIo3 ALI-ABA 95, SUBMIssION OF BURFORD GROUP LLC ON
WORKING GROUP'S IssUE PAPER CONCERNING ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING 100
(2012); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American
Litigation, 5 8 UCLAL. REv. 571, 591-92 (2010).
85. See Jennifer Banzaca, In Turbulent Markets, Hedge Fund Managers Turn to Litigation Funding for
Absolute, Uncorrelated Returns, HEDGE FUND L. REP. 2 (June 24, 2oo9), http://www.juriscapitalcorp
.coiimages/Hedge%2oFund%2oLaw%2oReporto/2oArticle.pdf (discussing the due diligence
of CaseFunding, Juris, and Juridica); Placing of 8o,ooo,ooo Ordinary Shares at a Price of loo
Pence per Ordinary Share and Admission to Trading on AIM 21, BURFORD CAPITAL, LTD.,
http://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/1o/burford-admission-document
.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2014) ("The Investment Adviser will conduct due diligence into each
investment... .").
86. Banzaca, supra note 85, at 2.
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* the timing and likelihood of settlement.
Ordinarily, ALF entities also avoid cases that are likely to go to trial - especially
before a jury-because trials introduce an "element of unpredictability into
a case."88
In addition to these factors, the four funders also consider matters beyond
the legal merits. For example, the financiers will consider the "fit" between
counsel and the claim, including whether the lawyers have litigated similar
cases and possess successful track records.8 9 The funders also consider the
claim's political and social repercussions, such as political pressures that could
affect decisions by government agencies or "legislative changes that could affect
the outcome of the case."9 o
In sum, any claims that come before these four entities are likely rigorously
vetted. But the same may not be true for the ALF industry as a whole, due to
the tremendous costs involved. For example, one established entity spends an
average of seventy-five to one hundred thousand dollars on due diligence per
claim.9 1 Thus, financiers with less capitalization may succumb to pressure to
cut corners.
Finally, even if funders conduct rigorous due diligence, financiers may still
back suits with low probabilities of success at trial.92 Where it is cheaper for a
defendant to settle a claim than litigate it, ALF entities can generate significant
profits from relatively weak suits.93 This situation may also partly explain why
ALF entities avoid cases that are likely to go to trial.94 A full adjudication forces
the parties to reach the merits of the underlying claims, thereby exposing the
weaknesses in a plaintiffs case. This is not to say that ALF entities invest in
meritless suits. But it seems that ALF entities would prefer cases that offer
timelier, pre-trial payoffs.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 2.
go. Id.
g. Garber, supra note 6, at 26.
92. John Beisner, Jessica Miller & Gary Rubin, Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-Party




94. Banzaca, supra note 85, at 2.
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C. ALF Entities Can Improve Incentives to Vet Qui Tam Actions
Although industry practice among ALF entities is unclear, financiers in qui
tam suits will likely face particular pressure to conduct rigorous due diligence.9 s
This pressure stems from the reputational costs of funding qui tam claims of
dubious legitimacy- costs unique to litigating with the DOJ.
Proponents of ALF have recently argued that funders face reputational
costs to investing in meritless claims. If a financier becomes associated with
nuisance suits, its involvement in a case might suggest that the claim is weak
and "undercut the plaintiffs bargaining power.", 6 As a result, defendants can
punish ALF entities for pursuing frivolous claims in the past. This argument
generally ignores the realities of litigation. Contracts between an ALF entity
and a plaintiff are often subject to non-disclosure agreements. 97 Additionally,
even if a defendant were to discover the source of a plaintiffs funding, that
information would likely be covered by attorney-client privilege.9" Given these
hurdles, it is unlikely that a defendant would uncover ALF backing, let alone
ascertain whether the financier's previous cases were "frivolous."
Likewise, the party most capable of punishing a plaintiff for accepting
financing- the judge9 9 - has the least information about financiers.' While a
defendant might devote a few sentences in a brief or motion to criticize an ALF
95. Of course, qui tam suits rarely go to trial after the DOJ intervenes. However, it appears safe
to assume that the DOJ's intervention decision also takes into account the probability of
success at trial, lest the DOJ put its money and reputation on the line only to lose in court.
g6. Lyon, supra note 84, at 595.
97. See Steinitz, supra note 25, at 475-76 (noting that an indicative agreement "specifically
prohibits any 'announcement concerning the existence of th[e] Agreement, the funding of
the Claim . . , or the identity of the Funder[]"' (quoting Funding Agreement Between
Treca Financial Solutions, Friends of the Defense of the Amazon § 12.3 (Oct. 31, 2010)));
Maya Steinitz, Some Thoughts About Plaintiffs' Due Diligence, MODEL LITIG. FIN. CONT. (Aug.
5, 2013), http://litigationfinancecontract.con/some-thoughts-about-plaintiffs-due-diligence
(noting that the lack of transparency in litigation finance contracts has undermined the
growth of reputational markets for ALF entities).
9s. See infra Part HI.
99. See Bert I. Huang, Litigation Finance: What Do judges Need to Know?, 45 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 525, 528 (2012) ("To use such tools most effectively, judges will need to understand
how outside financing might press against (or in favor of) the plaintiffs' interests in any
given case.").
oo. See id. ("After decades of experience with contingency-fee class actions, the judiciary may
have a good grasp of how to identify conflicting interests and other dangers, in that familiar
setting. But third-party funding is newer and more complex, involving investors who may
have no duty to the class members and whose interests may diverge from those of both
counsel and class.").
2439
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
entity's history, the defendant is unlikely to show that the financier's previous
cases were so without merit that the plaintiffs case is also frivolous. In short, it
does not appear that a defendant could meaningfully influence the decision of a
judge based on an ALF's reputation.
Qui tam claims, however, involve a repeat party that would be highly
interested in the presence of an ALF entity-the DOJ. The agency's attorneys
would likely want to know relators' sources of funding, as this could influence
the success of litigation.o' Furthermore, agency attorneys have wide access to
information and can gather evidence on a financier's history of funding.o2
Finally, DOJ attorneys would likely be attuned to the reputation of an ALF
entity, as the DOJ is often in the media spotlight and under congressional
scrutiny. 03 In fact, Congress has demonstrated its willingness to haul the
agency into legislative hearings concerning the DOJ's intervention decisions.0 4
Accordingly, the DOJ's reputation would likely rise and fall with the reputation
of the ALF entity. Thus, ALF entities are unlikely to fund qui tam suits of
dubious merit, as funding such claims would likely alienate the DOJ and
adversely affect the financier's reputation in any future qui tam claim.
The reputational argument does suffer from a drawback. If repeat player
status with the DOJ is sufficient to incentivize rigorous due diligence, then qui
tam counsel should also have high rates of DOJ intervention. As previously
noted, that is not the case.' There are at least two potential explanations for
this situation. First, qui tam counsel may be rationally calculating the expected
value of claims. For many cases, the expected value of a claim with a low chance
of intervention may still be greater than the expected loss to counsel's
1o1. See Michael Lawrence Kolis, Comment, Settlingfor Less: The Department offustice's Command
Performance Under the 1986 False Claims Amendments Act, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 409, 438
(1993).
io2. See, e.g., CLAIRE M. SYLVIA, THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT: FRAUD AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT
5 10:70 (2013) (discussing the DOJ's authority to obtain information under the FCA's
provisions for civil investigative demands (CIDs)).
103. See Pamela H. Bucy, Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act: Iterated Games and Close-
Knit Groups, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1021, 1032 n.75 (2005) ("If you can develop a reputation for
bringing meritorious cases, the reception you receive from the government will be far
different than the one you will receive if you throw every qui tam claim you can find against
the wall in the hope that something will stick." (quoting Mitchell R. Kreindler, So You
Wanna Be a Whistleblower's Lawyer? 2 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript))).
104. JOINT STAFF REPORT, 113 CONG., DOJ's QUID PRO QUO WITH ST. PAUL: How ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL THOMAS PEREZ MANIPULATED JUSTICE AND IGNORED THE RULE OF LAw
I (2013).
ios. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
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reputation. Second, even if qui tam counsel act with the best of intentions, qui
tam claims may be uniquely difficult to vet.
In either case, ALF entities can improve the probability of legitimate claims
reaching the DOJ. Given that litigation finance is relatively new to qui tam,
financiers will likely wish to make good "first impressions," as these initial
cases will color future interactions with the agency.
Additionally, litigation finance can improve the incentives for qui tam
counsel to vet claims. As previously noted, ALF entities examine the "fit"
between lawyers and the case as part of their due diligence. o6 Thus, qui tam
firms' intervention rates will likely be a significant factor in whether a financier
invests. Likewise, it is unlikely that qui tam firms would submit weak cases to
ALF entities. If particular counsel gain a reputation of submitting duds to
financiers, those firms are unlikely to draw funding when they submit stronger
claims. At the very least, the terms of financing are likely to be less favorable
because of the firms' higher appearance of risk.107
Finally, even if qui tam actions are particularly difficult to vet, ALF entities
provides two additional tiers of due diligence. Dialogue between qui tam
counsel and outside lawyers could expose weaknesses and ensure that only
stronger claims proceed. Thus, on the whole, it appears that ALF-backed suits
would be of greater rather than lesser quality.
D. It Appears that the DOJ Would Intervene More Often in ALF-Backed Suits
If ALF entities properly vet qui tam claims, their backing could
substantially aid DOJ prosecutions in two ways. First, given the DOJ's policy
of "outsourcing" investigation to relators and their counsel, ALF entities could
ensure that financial strains do not prevent legitimate claims from being filed.
Second, given ALF entities' reputational stake in the outcome of qui tam cases,
the DOJ could use the presence of a financier as a proxy for merit. As
previously discussed, ALF entities and the DOJ use similar metrics for
determining whether to participate in a suit.os Where a qui tam relator has
litigation financing, the DOJ could therefore expend fewer resources vetting
the suit and more time prosecuting the action. Thus, the DOJ may intervene
more frequently in ALF-backed suits and drive the market for litigation
financing.
106. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
107. See Barksdale, supra note 7, at 710.
108. See supra Sections II.A-B.
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Nonetheless, this outcome is not guaranteed. The DOJ might in fact
intervene less frequently in ALF-backed suits. Although there is little publicly
available information on how the DOJ chooses to intervene, at least one
commentator has speculated that the agency often declines suits where the
relator has significant financial resources.'o9 In such cases, relators can likely
effectively litigate on their own."o The DOJ might therefore be less likely to
intervene in an action if the relator has a third-party funder.
Similarly, litigation finance is still a controversial practice, and the DOJ
might not risk its reputation by intervening in such claims. For example, an
oft-noted criticism of litigation finance is that it allows third parties to gain
undue influence over the litigation."' In practice, ALF entities have publicly
disavowed the accusation."1 2 Nonetheless, should it become public that the
DOJ is bringing a suit financed by hedge funds, there may be public outcry
that the agency has been captured by opportunistic actors.
If ALF were to decrease the probability of the DOJ intervening in a claim,
this outcome would likely end the market for qui tam financing. Historically,
the odds of winning a qui tam case significantly decrease should the DOJ
decline to intervene."' Without the DOJ, relators and their funders must
shoulder the costs of discovery, motion practice, and trial. In turn, third-party
funders actively avoid suits that could be tried before a jury. Thus, financiers
are unlikely to fund actions should the DOJ become less likely to intervene.
The effect of ALF on the agency's intervention rates is hard to predict.
Nonetheless, the DOJ may respond with a relatively straightforward risk-
benefit analysis. The agency would calculate the amount of money and time it
saves by relying, in part, on ALF entities to conduct due diligence on claims.
The agency would then determine the marginal benefit of using these resources
elsewhere. Lastly, the DOJ would weigh this marginal benefit against the
potential monetary and reputational costs of intervening in an ALF-backed
action.
The outcome of this cost-benefit analysis will likely be somewhat case
dependent. On the whole, it appears that ALF should increase the probability
of the DOJ intervening in an action. There is no question that the agency
currently faces a growing backlog of qui tam claims. There is also no question
iog. Kolis, supra note ioi, at 438.
o. Id.
ii. Beisner et al., supra note 92, at 7-8.
112. See Banzaca, supra note 85, at 5.
113. See Broderick, supra note 5, at 974; Civil Div., Fraud Statistics, U.S. DEP'T JUST. 2 (2013),
http://www.justice.gov/civil/docs-forms/C-FRAUDSFCAStatistics.pdf (using 2013 data).
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that the agency lacks the resources to vet new complaints in a timely manner.
Given the DOJ's resource constraints, the agency will likely seek to intervene in
the most financed and investigated suits. These suits will most often be ALF-
backed claims.
III. CHALLENGES TO ALF ENTITIES' PARTICIPATION IN OUI TAM
CLAIMS
Assuming that ALF entities pursue qui tam financing, the funders still face
a challenge in collecting sufficient information to vet relators' claims. In
particular, ALF entities will likely need access to work product and attorney-
client privileged information. Ordinarily, funders do not seek confidential
information during their due diligence for risk of waiving privilege.'"4 Instead,
ALF suppliers primarily use publicly available information, such as pleadings,
motions, and trial records."s These documents generally provide sufficient
factual information to vet the claims.116
No such publicly available information is available for qui tam claims. As
previously discussed, relators and their counsel are in greatest need of funding
during the early phases of a qui tam investigation. During this period, there is
no publicly available information about the frauds involved in the suit. If there
were, the FCA's public disclosure bar would prevent the relator from filing in
the first place."' Similarly, while the relators must file a complaint with the
court, the complaint remains under seal until the DOJ decides whether to
intervene. Thus, much like investors in IRS whistleblower suits, financiers in
qui tam actions "are left to gauge the strength, and potential payoff, of any
114. See Banzaca, supra note 85, at 4.
115. See id.; see also SEBOK & WENDEL, supra note ii, at n.117; MOLOT, supra note 84, at lo4;
Letter from Juridica Capital Mgmt Ltd. to ABA Comm'n on Ethics 20/20 (Feb. 17, 2011), in
Comments: Alternative Litigation Financing Working Group Issues Paper, A.B.A.,
at 67, 68, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2o1ibuild/ethics_2020
/coinments on alternativelitigation financingissues-paper.pdf.
1s. Kocieniewski, supra note 46.
117. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012) ("The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this
section, unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same allegations or
transactions as alleged in the action of claims were publicly disclosed-(i) in a Federal
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the Government or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report, hearing,
audit, or investigation; or (iii) from the news media, unless the action is brought by the
Attorney General or the person bringing the action is an original source of the
information.").
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claim by reviewing the documentation provided by the informant and his
lawyer. ".8
The courts have recognized that under such circumstances, it is impossible
to properly vet a suit without exchanging privileged information. For example,
in United States ex rel. Purcell v. MI Corp., the federal district court for the
District of Columbia addressed whether a relator's counsel waived work
product protection by giving materials authored by the attorney to the DOJ." 9
The court concluded that work product protection remained, since " [w] ithout
those communications, the government could not proceed with its case.""o
Similarly, in Miller v. Holzmann, the court addressed whether disclosures of
attorney-client privileged information waived protection. As the court
reasoned, the attorney-client privilege encourages the full disclosure of all the
facts from the client to the lawyer, while the False Claims Act furthers
Congress's intention that the whistleblower tell the government all that he or
she knows. "Both policies would be negated if relator's attorney-client privilege
were forfeited."m.
In sum, given that ALF entities and the DOJ use the same criteria for
vetting suits, it is highly unlikely that financiers could conduct the same due
diligence without privileged information. Individual funders have less
experience than the DOJ with vetting qui tam suits, retain fewer lawyers, and
cannot turn to other government agencies for assistance. Indeed, funders have
publicly admitted as much. As one financier lamented about qui tam claims,
"The key is visibility: how much can the fund find out about the case? Without
a reasonable chance of quantifying the probability of success, the fund manager
is unlikely to invest.""
As the rest of this Part demonstrates, there are significant unresolved
questions about how much information third-party financiers can obtain. In
particular, courts are split on whether a plaintiffs disclosure of confidential
information to an ALF entity waives attorney-client privilege and work product
u1s. Turley, supra note 51.
11g. 2o9 F.R.D. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 2002).
120. Id.
121. 24o F.R.D. 20 (D.D.C. 2007).
122. Id. at 23; see also United States ex rel. Minge v. TECT Aerospace, Inc., No. 07-1212-MLB,
2011 WL 1885934 (D. Kan. May 18, 2011) (protecting attorney-client privileged
communications between relators, their attorneys, and agents for the government); United
States ex rel. Schweizer v. Oce, N.V., 577 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173-74 (D.D.C. 20o8) (noting that
the relator's disclosures to the government include documents covered by attorney-client
privilege).
123. Turley, supra note 51.
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protection.'" Without such protection, adversaries can access the materials
during discovery and uncover damaging information or litigation strategy. 2 s In
turn, relators and their attorneys are unlikely to share privileged information
with ALF entities, and financiers will likely lack sufficient information to
conduct their due diligence.
A. Communications Likely Waive Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege exists "to encourage full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients.",,, 6 As such, the privilege
covers "(1) ... communication [s] (2) made between privileged persons (3) in
confidence (4) for the purpose of obtaining or providing legal assistance for the
client."2 ' Given this narrow purpose, disclosing attorney-client privileged
documents to third parties waives the privilege.12' This is the case even if the
disclosure is made subject to a confidentiality agreement. 29 Thus, under
privilege law in most jurisdictions, "sharing of privileged communications with
an ALF supplier is a voluntary disclosure that may effect a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege."'
Nonetheless, ALF entities may be able to avail themselves of a common law
exception to waiver. In particular, communications will not waive privilege
where the entities share a "common interest" in the litigation.'"' Despite this
rule, the courts' definitions of "common interest" have been anything but
common, making the exception difficult to apply.3 2
Over the years, courts have embraced two schools of thought regarding
common interest. Under the narrow view, courts have applied the common
interest exception only if the interests at issue are identical and legal."' Other
124. SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note 11, S IV.B.
125. Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1124 (2012).
126. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 (2000).




132. Miller v. Holzmann, 24o F.R.D. 20, 22 (D.D.C. 2007).
133. George S. Mahaffey, Jr., Taking Aim at the Hydra: Why the "Allied-Party Doctrine" Should Not
Apply in Qui Tam Cases When the Government Declines to Intervene, 23 REv. LITIG. 629, 666
(2004).
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courts, however, have interpreted common interest broadly to cover numerous
situations: "where litigation has yet to occur; where the interests at issue are
not solely legal; where a lawyer is not present; where the clients have interests
that may be slightly adverse; and where the parties' only interests are in the
outcome of the litigation."'" Thus, as one district court judge has concluded,
"for every case construing the common interest narrowly, there seems to be a
corresponding one reaching the opposite conclusion.""s
The courts' handling of common interest in the ALF context has been just
as fragmented. To begin, ALF entities have sought to contract out of the
privilege problem by adopting a tool from multi-defendant litigation: common
interest agreements."' In theory, these agreements permit parties to share
attorney-client privileged materials without risking waiver by demonstrating
through contract that the parties intend to share a common interest. Thus, to
be effective, common interest agreements cite case law and specifically outline
the common interest, the types of protected communications, and the parties
involved.
Although only a handful of courts have addressed the efficacy of such
contracts in the context of litigation finance, they have split on the outcome.'
The primary disagreement has been whether parties negotiating in an arm's-
length transaction can share a common interest. The first court to address the
issue was the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware in Leader
Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc.'" The decision arose as a review of a
magistrate judge's determination that ALF entities and plaintiffs do not share a
common interest.'3 9 In its opinion, the district court acknowledged that "the
law regarding common interest is unsettled and that this case presented a close
question."o4 0  Nonetheless, the court affirmed the magistrate judge's
134. Id. at 668-69.
135. Miller, 24o F.R.D. at 22.
136. Michael D. Torpey et al., Defending Securities Claims, in A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY 607,
928 (2o6).
137. Meriam N Alrashid et al., Impact of Third Party Funding on Privilege in Litigation and
International Arbitration, 6 DIsp. RESOL. INT'L 101, 109-11 (2012).
138. 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010). Although the district court in this case was reviewing the
decision of a magistrate judge under the highly deferential "clearly erroneous" standard, it
appears that the district court largely agreed with the magistrate judge's rationale. See id. at
377. Specifically, the court described the magistrate judge's order as "thorough and well-
reasoned," and found that the party challenging the order "failed to argue that there are any
specific deficiencies or flaws in the ruling." Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 376.
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determination that the communications were not protected.'' As the
magistrate judge concluded, although ALF entities and recipients might share
an identical legal interest after signing the funding arrangement, the parties
lacked a common interest during the initial arm's-length negotiations.' Since
the parties transferred the privileged documents as part of the negotiations
phase, the plaintiff and financier lacked an "actual interest at that moment" and
could not appeal to the common interest doctrine. 43
Commentators regularly cite Leader Technologies for the principle that
disclosures waive attorney-client privilege.'" But the literature ignores that the
magistrate judge found immaterial the presence of a common interest
agreement between the ALF funder and recipient. 4 s This oversight is likely due
to the fact that these observers do not examine, or cite, the transcript from the
magistrate judge's hearing with the parties.' There, the magistrate judge
found that a "negotiation at arm's length . . . precludes a finding that there's a
common legal interest," regardless of the agreement. 47
Despite the decision in Leader Technologies, other ALF entities have had
partial success with common interest agreements. For example, the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has held that
communications between an ALF entity and a recipient did not waive attorney-
client privilege, since the parties "have a common interest in the successful
141. Id. at 379.
142. The magistrate judge recognized a long line of precedent holding that parties in negotiations
over a business transaction do not share common interests. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 6-12, 67, Leader Techs., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (No. o8-862-JJF-LPS) (citing Net2Phone, Inc.
v. Ebay, Inc., No. 06-cv-2469-KSH, 20o8 WL 8183817, at *8 (D.N.J. June 26, 2008)
(finding that the parties to a business transaction "had adverse interests because IDT and
Net2Phone were negotiating the price IDT would pay for Net2Phone's shares"), Corning
Inc. v. SRU Biosystems, LLC, 223 F.R.D. 189, 190 (D. Del. 2004) ("[T]he Court views the
negotiations between these two corporations to reveal that SRU's disclosures to BD were
made not in an effort to formulate a joint defense but rather to persuade BD to invest in
SRU."), and Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[T]he plaintiffs
failed to prove that the parties to the negotiations shared an identity of interests such to
invoke the common interest doctrine.")).
143. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 12-13, 22.
144. See, e.g., SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note 11, 5 IV.B.2.c.
145. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 6 ("The only argument that Facebook
has to say that's not a common legal interest is they say there's an arm's length negotiation.
Well, in every common interest agreement, you're going to have some type of
negotiation.").
146. See, e.g., SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note 11.
147. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 6-7, 67-71.
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outcome of the litigation."' 4 As the court concluded, the plaintiff "may not
have been able to pursue [the litigation against IBM] without the financial
assistance of [the ALF entity] .""* A Delaware district court has come to the
same conclusion. Having "reviewed in camera the Advisory Services Agreement
and the Common Interest Agreement between" the ALF entity and recipient,
the district court found that the parties "do share a common legal interest."'5 0
Despite their holdings, the two decisions finding common interest provide
little guidance to practitioners. The courts gave no explanation of their
reasoning other than the short quotes above, in part because the decisions came
in the form of discovery orders."s' Such orders are ordinarily cursory given the
low likelihood of reversal on appeal. As a result, neither the Devon nor Walker
courts addressed why a common interest agreement can overcome the parties'
adverse and arm's-length relationship. Thus, given the precedent from Leader
Technologies and the limited analysis in Devon and Walker, the utility
of common interest agreements for protecting attorney-client privilege is far
from clear.
B. Whether Communications Waive Work Product Protection Remains
Unresolved
Despite the uncertainty surrounding waiver of attorney-client privilege, it
is less likely that disclosure would waive the protections of the work product
doctrine."s2 The purpose of this doctrine is to protect the thoughts, mental
impressions, and strategies of attorneys from being discovered by opposing
parties in litigation.' Because work product focuses on protecting the privacy
of the attorney's mental impressions, rather than encouraging communication
between attorney and client, the standard for waiving work product differs
from that for attorney-client privilege. Generally, only disclosures that
substantially increase the likelihood of documents falling into the hands of an
adversary in litigation will waive work product protection.s 4
148. Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 10-cV-2899-JHS, 2012 WL 4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012).
149. Id.
iso. Memorandum Order at 2, Walker Digital, LLC v. Google Inc., No. 11-cv-309-SLR (D. Del.
Feb. 12, 2013), ECF No. 280.
151. See Devon IT, Inc., 2012 WL 4748160; Walker Digital, LLC, No. 11-cv-3o9-SLR.
152. SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note 11, § W.B.3-
153. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516-17 (1947); SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note 11.
154. 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2024 (3d ed. 2013).
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As with attorney-client privilege, ALF entities have sought to avoid work
product waiver through contract- non-disclosure agreements. This tactic has
had varying degrees of success. On the one hand, at least two district courts
have held that the agreements shield transfers of work product between
financiers and recipients. For example, in Mondis Technology, Ltd. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas
recently held that disclosure of documents revealing a plaintiffs litigation and
licensing strategy did not waive work-product protection."ss Since the
documents were subject to non-disclosure agreements, the court concluded
that the exchanges "did not substantially increase the likelihood that an
adversary would come into possession of the materials.""' Later that year, a
federal district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania came to the same
conclusion in Devon, discussed above.1 '
Nonetheless, the courts have not been uniform in their treatment of non-
disclosure agreements. And once again, the primary source of opposition is the
Delaware district court's opinion in Leader Technologies. Although secondary
sources cite the decision as only pertaining to waiver of attorney-client
privilege,s5 the district court also found that the parties waived work-product
protection. 5 9 Indeed, in the hearing before the magistrate judge, the plaintiff-
recipient argued that its non-disclosure agreement with the ALF entity
prevented waiver of work product."'o Nonetheless, the magistrate judge held
that a non-disclosure agreement is insufficient to protect work product. The
155. No. 2:0 7 -cv- 56 5 -TJW-CE, 2011 WL 1714304, at *3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011).
156. Id.
157. Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. lo-cV-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
27, 2012) ("The documents turned over to Burford were done so under a Confidentiality,
Common Interest and Non[-]Disclosure Agreement. . . . Given these controlled conditions,
there was no waiver of the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine ....
1ss. SEBOK &WENDEL, supra note ii, § IV.B.3.
159. See Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375-76 (D. Del. 2010) ("With
respect to the production of privileged documents, Leader contends this portion of the
Order is clearly erroneous because it was based on the finding that no common legal interest
protecting attorney-client or work product privileged information could exist because a deal was
not consummated between Leader and the litigation financing companies." (emphasis
added)); Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 4-5 ("I do want to point out to the
Court that Facebook doesn't dispute that the documents in question are, in fact, privileged
and work product. That's not an issue for the Court.").
160. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at 5 ("[The documents] were sent by email
after everything was signed. So the evidence in this case is shown [sic] conclusively that
Leader insisted upon a signed NDA before they could make any type of confidential
information to these financing companies.").
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parties must also share a common interest."' The magistrate judge further
reasoned that the existence of a confidentiality agreement showed that the
parties lacked a common interest. The agreement would be unnecessary if the
parties had a common stake in the litigation.12 Since the district court's
opinion affirmed the magistrate judge's order in its entirety,16 3 scholars citing
only the opinion have not realized the extent of the court's holding.'6 4
The decision in Leader Technologies therefore reflects an expansive view of
waiver for work product. Despite the fact that non-disclosure agreements
prevent communications from reaching potential adversaries, the court
required common interest between parties. Thus, at least in some courts,
funders and recipients will have to demonstrate common interest prior to
exchanging information covered by either attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine.
IV. SOLUTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE DILEMMA
As this Note argues, the answer to the common interest dilemma may lie in
how ALF entities obtain a legal interest in a qui tam claim. Although contested
by one financier,' commentators generally agree that ALF entities purchase an
interest in a claim through partial assignment.' 6 Unlike a contract, which
161. See id. at to ("Isn't she saying that they're sure if there were a common interest and
privilege, she was going to say it was waived because there's no confidentiality agreement?
But it seems in the portion I'm reading from, she's also saying there is no privilege because
there is no common interest." (citing Net2Phone, Inc. v. Ebay, Inc., No. o6-cV-2469-KSH,
20o8 WL 8183817 (D.N.J. June 26, 20o8))); see also Katz v. AT&T Corp., 191 F.R.D. 433, 438
n.6 (E.D. Pa. 2000) ("[T]he interests of the parties were clearly adversarial and the
negotiations over the terms of the licensing agreement were conducted at arm[']s length[.]
Other examples in the record before the Special Master include the confidentiality
agreement between the parties which was entered into, according to the terms of the
correspondence, so that the content of their discussions could not be used by either
participant for any other purpose, including a future lawsuit between them.").
162. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 142, at lo.
163. Leader Techs., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 379.
164. See, e.g., SEBOK&WENDEL, supra note ii, § IV.B.3.
165. In its submission to the ABA's working group on litigation finance, one of the world's
largest litigation financiers, Burford Group LLC, likened its investments to a lien ("[a] car
lease is not a bad comparison") rather than an assignment ("Burford does not buy or take
assignments of claims."). MOLOT, supra note 84, at loo.
166. Despite Burford's submission, the ABA's informational report on litigation finance
ultimately rejected the funder's characterization of its investments. See SEBOK & WENDEL,
supra note ii, S II.A ("Consumer ALF suppliers are distinguishable from settlement
factoring companies; the former take a partial assignment in a claim that has not yet been
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creates a legal right, an assignment is an agreement to transfer a right.'6 7
Accordingly, a partial assignment is a partial transfer of a right.'6 8 In the
context of litigation finance, if a relator seeks funding, it would transfer a
portion of its damages claim to an ALF entity. Likewise, if relator's counsel
seeks funding, it would transfer a portion of its contingency fee to the ALF
entity.169 As a result of the partial assignment, the ALF entity and the relator
each become "real parties in interest" 7o and both have a cause of action under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' In practice, the ALF entity will not sue
and only the plaintiff will bring the action as a party. 72
Significantly, qui tam relators obtain an interest in the government's fraud
claim using the same legal instrument as ALF entities: partial assignment. As
the Supreme Court has held, "[t]he FCA can reasonably be regarded as
effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim" to the
settled or reduced to judgment, while the latter purchases a claim that has been reduced to
judgment . . . ."); see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in Aggregate
Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1323 (2012) ("[L]ike an attorney, a financier decides
whether to front the litigation costs for a partial assignment of the plaintiffs proceeds on a
case-by-case or litigation-by-litigation basis."); Julia H. McLaughlin, Litigation Funding:
Charting a Legal and Ethical Course, 31 VT. L. REV. 615, 62o (2007) ("Claim alienation is
typically partial but can also be full. The LLA sets forth the terms of the parties' agreement
and secures the LFC's interest in the proceeds of the lawsuit through assignment.").
167. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 73-74 (3d ed. 2004).
i68. 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 129 (2013).
169. Barksdale, supra note 7, at 708.
170. See United States ex rel. Eisenstein v. City of New York, 556 U.S. 928, 934-35 (2009) ("The
phrase, 'real party in interest,' is a term of art utilized in federal law to refer to an actor with
a substantive right whose interests may be represented in litigation by another.").
171. Assignments, supra note 168 ("The general rule . . . is that ... the assignor and [partial]
assignee may unite in a suit for the enforcement of the chose, or the assignor may sue alone.
The [partial] assignee may not sue on it alone in his or her own name, since assignment of
only a part of an entire claim or debt does not vest in the assignee a right of action in his or
her own name. Where both the assignor and [partial] assignee sue, the procedure actually
constitutes the prosecution of a single cause of action, with the only difference being that the
proceeds of a judgment secured from the defendant are not necessarily given directly or
solely to the person who had original title to the cause of action."); see also 6A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 154, § 1545 ("[W]hen there has been only a partial assignment the assignor
and the assignee each retain an interest in the claim and are both real parties in interest . . .
under Rule 17(a) either party may sue to protect those rights.").
172. An entity can be a "real party in interest" without being an actual party to the case.
Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 934-35.
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relator. 73 Additionally, much like an ALF entity, the government remains a
"real party in interest" even if it is not a party to the suit.'74
As this Part argues, the similar means through which an ALF entity and a
qui tam relator obtain standing have three important consequences. First, ALF
entities can use case law protecting exchanges between relators and the DOJ to
justify protections for relators and financiers. Second, through a quirk of qui
tam law, relators can turn ALF entities into fellow whistleblowers by
transferring privileged and non-privileged information to them. As co-relators,
co-parties in interest, and potential co-plaintiffs in the qui tam suit, the relator
and ALF entity would likely share a common interest. Third, relators can make
revocable, gratuitous partial assignments to ALF entities during the due
diligence phase in order to align the entities' interests, thereby preventing
waiver.
A. ALF Entities and Relators Can Appeal to Case Law Protecting
Communications Between the DOJ and Relators
Although ALF entities might ordinarily lack a common interest with
recipients, it appears that the interests of ALF entities and qui tam relators are
uniquely aligned. This is demonstrated by comparing the relationship between
ALF entities and relators to that of the DOJ and relators. Given that the courts
have almost universally protected exchanges with the DOJ,s7 1 ALF entities
could justify protection by analogizing their relationship to that of the
government.
As demonstrated in Leader Technologies, ALF entities face a challenge
because courts conflate funders' due diligence phase with arm's-length
negotiation. In practice, however, it is possible to distinguish these two
periods. The DOJ's prosecution of qui tam claims illustrates as much.
173. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773 (2000).
Additionally, while the Court did not define what it means to "partially assign" a claim, it
later clarified the difference between such an assignment and "a contract for legal services."
Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 289 (2008). "The latter confers a
property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not." Id.
174. As a partial assignee, the relator files the qui tam action as a real party in interest and a party
to the case. See Eisenstein, 556 U.S. at 935. The government, on the other hand, is a real party
in interest but a non-party until it elects to intervene in the case. Id. Should the government
choose to decline intervention, it continues as a non-party. Id.
175. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2003);
United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 209 F.R.D. 21, 26 (D.D.C. 2002); United States
ex rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), 209 F.R.D. 475, 479 (D. Utah 2001); United States ex rel.
Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 68o, 686 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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The courts have acknowledged that the DOJ and the relator go through
two phases. The first is the due diligence phase during investigation and
litigation of the qui tam claim.76 The second phase follows settlement or
judgment, and entails an arm's-length negotiation between the relator and the
DOJ over the size of the relator's share.'" As previously noted, the courts have
universally recognized that the DOJ and relator share a common interest
during the due diligence phase. The parties are united in a common effort to
investigate and prosecute the defendants.'15 Meanwhile, the courts have also
recognized that the DOJ and relator lack a common interest during
negotiations over the relator's share.179 At this point, each party is bargaining
over a pot that is zero-sum.
ALF entities can appeal to the same analytical distinction. The due diligence
phase of an ALF entity and the DOJ is largely similar. Both entities are vetting
the suit to determine whether they will pursue the claim. Both entities are
requesting privileged information to conduct their investigations. And both
entities stand to profit tremendously from the successful prosecution of the
defendant.
Once an ALF entity completes its due diligence, the arm's-length
negotiation phase begins. At this time, the ALF entity and the relator bargain
over contract terms and how the parties will share any proceeds from the suit.
Since ALF entities go through similar due diligence/arm's length negotiation
phases as the DOJ, ALF entities may be able to persuade the courts to find
common interest using the same analytical distinction.
Additionally, ALF entities can appeal to the same statutory and policy
rationale as the DOJ for finding common interest. The courts recognize two
reasons for protecting communications between the relator and government.
First, as a statutory basis, the False Claims Act provides that the relator shall
176. See (Redacted), 209 F.R.D. at 479 n.3 ("This is not to say, however, that the Relators and the
United States will always share this community of interest. At least one court has noted, in a
different context, that the interests of the government and Relators may diverge 'when it
comes time to pay the relator's share [of damages]."' (alteration in original) (quoting
United States ex rel. Thornton v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 207 F.3d 769, 773 (5th Cir.
2000))); see also United States ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. of Am., No. 99-cv-
3298, 2004 WL 2009413, at *6 (D.D.C. May 17, 2004) ("Relator Pogue's and the United
States' common interest in the prosecution of the defendants and settlement negotiations
that vindicate the interests of both Relator Pogue and the United States remain at this stage.
The point at which the Atlanta Physicians' contention might even be viable would be after
the settlement agreement was finalized. . . .
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bring the action "in the name of the Government" and allows the relator to
receive a percentage of the proceeds.so Thus, "the legislature left no doubt that
the relator is acting on behalf of the government."' Second, as a matter of
policy, protecting communications "advances the congressional desire that the
relator apprise the government of all he or she knows as a condition of
bringing a qui tam action.""' Thus, finding waiver would "discourage[] the
sort of comprehensive disclosure most likely to facilitate the government's
evaluation of the merits and its choice about whether to intervene." 8 3
These two rationales also apply to an ALF entity and a relator. First, a
relator acts on the ALF entity's behalf. As a partial assignee, the ALF entity is
the "real party in interest" to the suit, and can only vindicate its rights through
successful litigation by the whistleblower. Second, ALF would further
comprehensive disclosure between relators and the government' 84 Given the
DOJ's practice of outsourcing pre-intervention investigations to qui tam firms,
third-party financing would promote firms' investigations. These
investigations, in turn, apprise the government of all the information related to
the claim.
In fact, the legal interests of ALF entities and relators may be even more
closely aligned than those of the relator and the government. In a qui tam
claim, a relator retains several interests that are adverse to those of the
government. For example, the relator has the right to a hearing before the
Government dismisses the suit and the right to a judicial determination of
fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness before the government settles the
18o. Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 26 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2000)); see Miller v. Holzmann, 24o
F.R.D. 20, 21 (D.D.C. 2007) ("[T]he United States and the relator had a common interest in
the prosecution of common defendants in an existing civil or criminal case or both.");
(Redacted), 209 F.R.D. at 479 ("The Relators and the United States are co-plaintiffs, allied
in their interest in this litigation in identifying . . . false claims, proving them, obtaining
statutory redress in the form of damages, and distributing the proceeds of this suit."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
181. Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 26.
182. Miller, 24o F.R.D. at 23; see Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 26 ("The court's interpretation of the
FCA's language must include an examination of the design of the statute as a whole and to
[sic] its object and policy.").
183. United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 561 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
184. Of course, it could be argued that ALF entities do not meet the policy criteria because they
are third parties. However, relator's counsel is similarly a third party. Additionally, this
distinction ignores the way in which enforcement of the FCA has evolved over the years.
Given that the government is relying on third parties (e.g., relator's counsel) to conduct
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suit.'as Since ALF contracts generally do not contain similar provisions, ALF
entities and relators lack such adverse interests. 86
B. Using Partial Assignment to Align the Interests ofRelators and ALP Entities
Prior to Filing Complaints
Despite the similar rationale for protecting communications between ALF
entities and relators, financiers face an additional hurdle: the parties must
share a common interest at the time that the privileged materials are exchanged.
For the federal government this task is easy: it is the party that suffered the
injury and therefore shares a common interest with the relator early on. ALF
entities face a more difficult task. As noted previously, while courts are
generally willing to recognize that a financier shares a common interest after
signing a funding agreement, the parties lack a common interest beforehand.
Some ALFs have successfully contracted out of this dilemma by using common
interest and confidentiality agreements.'8 ' Given the uncertainty still
surrounding waiver of privilege, there remains a need for additional legal
mechanisms to ensure common interest.
A quirk of qui tam law, largely ignored in the secondary literature,' 8 may
provide a unique solution to relators and counsel seeking funding prior to filing
a complaint with the DOJ. While the Supreme Court has held that relators
have standing through the doctrine of partial assignment, it did not state when
that assignment actually occurs. One view suggests that the partial assignment
185. Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000) (citing
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B)).
86. Of course, the ALF's relationship also differs from the government's relationship in another
significant way-the former is contractual while the latter is statutory. Nonetheless, the
courts finding common interest have not done so on purely statutory grounds. Rather, the
courts focus on the language of the statute and the policy considerations implicated by
privilege. See Miller, 240 F.R.D. at 21; Purcell, 209 F.R.D. at 25 (citing United States ex rel.
Burroughs v. DeNardi Corp., 167 F.R.D. 680, 685-86 (S.D. Cal. 1996)); United States ex
rel. (Redacted) v. (Redacted), 209 F.R.D. 475, 479 (D. Utah 2001). Thus it does not appear
significant that the FCA is a statute rather than a contract.
1a7. See, e.g., Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., No. 1o-cv-2899, 2012 WL 4748160 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27,
2012).
i8. While scholars have cited these cases to argue that so-called "pre-filing" releases are
enforceable, see, e.g., Todd P. Photopulos & Graham W. Askew, Having Your Cake and
Eating It Too- The (Un)enforceability of Releases on Future Qui Tam Claims, i J. HEALTH &
LIFE Scl. L. 145, 157 (2008), it appears that not a single scholar has discussed how the timing
of partial assignments may be relevant for the purposes of discovery.
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occurs when the relator files his or her complaint with the government.18 9
Another suggests that the partial assignment occurs whenever a person learns
of fraud.190
The former interpretation provides relators little aid. But under the latter
view, the relator's disclosure of basic, non-privileged information about the
alleged fraud to the ALF entity might simultaneously turn the financier into a
partial assignee under the FCA. In other words, the financier would become
another whistleblower. As co-relators, the parties - under certain
circumstances -would share a common interest prior to exchanging any
privileged information. In fact, if the ALF entity becomes a co-relator
simultaneously with receiving information about the alleged fraud, then the
two-step exchange of factual-then-privileged information might be
unnecessary. The exchange of privileged information would simultaneously
transform the ALF into a co-relator, and the parties would share a common
interest at the time of the transmission.
1. Based on the Case Law of Several Circuits, It Appears that Persons Become
Partial Assignees Whenever They Learn ofFraud
The strategy of turning ALF entities into co-relators is supported by lower
court jurisprudence. At least two circuits have concluded that partial
assignment occurs upon learning of fraud.'"' These decisions arose from
disputes over "pre-filing releases." In essence, such releases are an agreement
by the relator to sell its claim to another entity.192 These sales are also rarely to
189. See In re Estate of Duxbury, 304 P.3d 480, 489 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013) ("[A] relator does not
have a property interest in a qul tam action or a portion of its future proceeds until he files
his qui tam lawsuit and serves his complaint and supporting evidence on the federal
government .... ). According to the Duxbury court, if individuals became partial assignees
upon learning of the fraud, then the FCA provision prohibiting these others' qui tam actions
could potentially effect unconstitutional "takings" of these employees' property by divesting
them of the ability to bring their own qui tam actions once one person files. Id. This is most
likely an incorrect statement of law, however, because assignments are freely revocable by
the assignor until the assignee provides some form of "value" in return. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 167, at 102 ("An assignee gives value by taking the assignment ... in exchange for
something that would be consideration for a promise . . . ."). Given that the relator does not
provide "value" until he or she files a complaint with the DOJ, the FCA first-to-file bar
would not constitute a "taking."
19o. See infra Subsection IV.B.i.
191. See United States v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 6oo F.3 d 319, 329 (4 th Cir. 2010); United States ex
rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F.3d 909, 912 (8th Cir. 2001).
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disinterested parties. Ordinarily, a relator releases the action to the alleged
defendant.'9 3 Since the defendant does not bring suit against itself, the sale
effectively settles the claim.
Despite the sales, some relators have violated their releases and filed
complaints with the DOJ. In the ensuing litigation, the DOJ sought a means to
preserve the relators' standing. As part of this strategy, the agency argued that
the relator cannot release its claim prior to filing a complaint,194 since at
common law a party cannot assign (or sell) a right that he or she does not yet
possess. 9s In other words, since a whistleblower only becomes a partial
assignee upon filing, the pre-filing release is invalid.196
The Eighth and Fourth Circuits rejected the DOJ's argument, although
their reasoning is brief. In United States ex rel. Gebert v. Transportation
Administration Services, the Eighth Circuit held that relators became partial
assignees once they "possessed all the necessary information" to proceed with
the qui tam complaint.'9 7 In coming to this conclusion, the court found that the
government could point to no authority to support its claim that assignment
occurs at the time of filing.'9' The court cited little additional authority of its
own. The Eighth Circuit quoted a single Ninth Circuit decision stating that
"the FCA effectively assigns the government's claims to qui tam plaintiffs ...
who then may sue."' 99 While this sentence seems to support the Eighth Circuit's
holding, the Ninth Circuit was not addressing the issue of timing under the
FCA; instead, it was addressing whether relators have Article III standing.2 oo
Thus, at best, the sentence is dicta unsupported by any independent statutory
analysis.
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Purdue Pharma L.P. offered similar
reasoning. The court held that once the relator "became aware of the fraud
causing the injury," he or she had the "necessary legal standing as a partial
assignee, to file a qui tam lawsuit."0 ' Thus, even if the relator chooses not to
193. See id.
194. See Gebert, 26o F.3d at 914-15.
195. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at 94-97.
196. See Gebert, 260 F.3d at 914-15.
197. Id.
198. See id. at 914.
igg. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th Cir. 1993)).
200. Kelly, 9 F.3 d at 748.
201. United States v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 6oo F.3d 319, 329 (4th Cir. 2010).
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file suit, she has "an interest in the lawsuit" regardless of whether she chooses
to vindicate it.202 The court cited no authority for any of these conclusions.
Despite this flaw, the circuits' holdings are likely supported by the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,203 where the Court first held that relators have standing as partial
assignees under the FCA. The Stevens Court addressed an alternative theory of
standing based on the fact that relators have a concrete interest in their portion
of the recovery. In rejecting this theory, it held that an "interest that is merely a
'byproduct' of the suit itself' will not support Article III standing.2 o Since the
relator's share of a suit is a by-product of filing a claim, the Court held that
partial assignment was the sole mechanism supporting relators' standing.
The Supreme Court's rationale in Stevens is likely applicable to the issue of
timing under the FCA. It appears that relators do not gain standing by simply
filing a claim, as this would be a by-product of the suit itself. Relators must
therefore have some type of concrete, pre-existing interest in the suit. The most
plausible mechanism would therefore be a partial assignment at the time of
discovering the fraud.
This interpretation further avoids the difficulties arising from the FCA's
statute of limitations. The circuits are split on the issue, but at least one court
of appeals and district courts in two other circuits have held that the statute of
limitations starts to run when relators acquire knowledge of the wrongful
activity.20 If a relator only becomes a partial assignee upon filing a complaint,
running the statute of limitations when she learns of the fraud would lead to an
absurd result. The statute of limitations would potentially bar the putative
relator from bringing suit even though she never had a legal claim. In other
words, it would be like barring a person who might sign a contract in the
future from bringing suit, because she could have signed the contract earlier.
202. Id. (quoting Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772
(2000)).
203. 529 U.S. 765.
2o4. Id. at 773 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998)).
205. See United States ex rel. Hyatt v. Northrop Corp., 91 F. 3d 1211, 1217-18 (9th Cir. 1996)
(explaining that a whistleblower's "duty to act must be triggered by his own knowledge,"
and thus a qui tam statute of limitations "start[s] to run when the plaintiff acquires
knowledge of the wrongful activity"); see also United States ex rel. Bidani v. Lewis, No. 97-
cv-6502, 1999 WL 163053, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 12, 1999) (reiterating the "three-year
knowledge rule" and applying it to the plaintiff); United States ex rel. Sanders v. E. Ala.
Healthcare Auth., 953 F. Supp. 1404, 1412 (M.D. Ala. 1996) ("The Plaintiffs must also show
that they acted within three years of learning of facts material to the false claim or within
three years of the time in which the government official responsible for this area knew or
should have known that false claims were submitted.").
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Finally, the circuit courts are unlikely to hold that the partial assignment
occurs upon filing, as this would overturn nearly twenty years of case law
upholding the validity of pre-filing releases. A release, by definition, is an
assignment of a right."o' Moreover, at common law, a party cannot assign a
right that he or she does not have.2 o7 Thus, if a relator only gains a right under
the FCA upon filing, he or she cannot sign an enforceable pre-filing release.
Given that at least four circuits2o8 and an even greater number of district
courts have held that pre-filing releases are enforceable,2 o' it is unlikely that the
other circuits will break rank. As the four circuit courts have recognized, pre-
filing releases serve an important public interest in encouraging private
settlement of claims. Thus, the four circuits have upheld-and the DOJ as
amicus curiae has defended-the enforceability of such releases where the
government has some prior knowledge of the fraud independent of the
relator's disclosures. 20
In sum, the Supreme Court's decision in Stevens and potential prudential
and public policy concerns indicate that the circuit courts will likely continue
holding that a relator becomes a partial assignee upon obtaining knowledge of
the fraud. It also does not appear that the Supreme Court is in any rush to hold
to the contrary. In 2olo, the Court denied certiorari in the Fourth Circuit case,
Purdue, and therefore declined to address the petitioner's claims that pre-filing
releases are unenforceable and that partial assignment under the FCA occurs
only upon filing."'
2. ALF Entities and Relators Can Use the Timing ofPartial Assignments to
Create Common Interest
Based on the decisions in Gebert and Purdue, a relator becomes a partial
assignee as soon as he or she knows of necessary information to have standing
to bring a claim. That threshold is quite low. The relator need only
2o6. See BLACK'S LAw DicTiONARY 1315 (8th ed. 2004) (defining release as "the act of giving up a
right or claim to the person against whom it could have been enforced").
207. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at 94-97.
208. See United States v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 6oo F.3d 319, 329 (4 th Cir. 2010); United States ex
rel. Ritchie v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 558 F.3d 1161, 1169-71 (1oth Cir. 2009); United States
ex rel. Gebert v. Transp. Admin. Servs., 260 F-3d 909, 916-17 (8th Cir. 2001); United States
ex rel. Hall v. Teledyne Wah Chang Albany, 104 F.3d 230, 233-34 ( 9th Cir. 1997).
209. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Nowak v. Medtronic, Inc., 8o6 F. Supp. 2d 310, 338 (D. Mass.
2011) (citing cases).
210. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma, 6oo F.3 d at 331.
211. United States ex rel. Radcliffe v. Purdue Pharma, L.P., 131 S. Ct. 477 (2010) (mem.).
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"sufficiently allege[] (1) an injury in fact to the United States that (2) is caused
by [the defendant's] alleged conduct . . . and (3) is likely to be redressed.""m
Thus, a relator does not even need to properly allege all of the elements of its
claim to establish standing; it just needs to claim an injury of a legally
cognizable right.2 13
This legal situation opens up a unique opportunity for qui tam relators and
ALF entities to share privileged information. To begin, a relator would enter
into confidentiality, non-disclosure, and common interest agreements with a
potential funder. Then, the relator would provide the ALF entity with enough
information to file a qui tam claim. The transmission might either be two-step
(non-privileged, factual information followed by privileged information), or
one-step (all the information at one time, should the ALF entity become a
partial assignee simultaneously with receiving privileged information). *
As a partial assignee, the ALF entity would become a co-relator, a co-party
in interest, and a potential co-plaintiff in the qui tam suit. Since the financier
cannot actually file the claim, due to the confidentiality and non-disclosure
agreements, there is no risk that the ALF entity would "race to the courthouse."
In fact, since the ALF entity depends on the relator to vindicate its legal interest
in the claim - by filing a complaint with the government - the interests of the
two parties are aligned and identical. Such common interest is buttressed by
the courts' long history of protecting privileged communications between co-
relators,2 1 s co-parties in interest,, 6 and potential co-plaintiffs."
212. Stauffer v. Brooks Bros., Inc., 619 F.3d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also id. at 1327-28
("The standing doctrine is intended to require that the plaintiff is a proper person to bring
the suit; it does not require that the plaintiff properly allege all of the elements of his claim.
Thus, standing does not depend on the merits of the plaintiffs contention that particular
conduct is illegal; it instead requires a claim to an injury of a legally cognizable right."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
213. Id. at 1327.
214. The FCA expressly permits third parties to become relators based on disclosures by insiders.
The FCA only requires that relators be the "original source" of information if the alleged
fraud has already been publicly disclosed-for example, through a governmental report or
through the news media. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2012). Since the FCA does not apply
the "original source" requirement to all qui tam claims, even though the Act's framers could
have, it appears that Congress intended for third parties to serve as relators.
215. Sokol v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 07-cv-8442-SHS, 2008 WL 3166662, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4,
2008) (finding that the common interest doctrine prevents waiver of attorney-client
privilege for "communications that are in furtherance of the common objective[]
between ... joint clients in their common false claims action," provided that co-relators are
identified to the court); In re Anand, No. o1-12-011o6-CV, 2013 WL 1316436 (Tex. App. Apr.
2, 2013) (holding that communications among relators were privileged); Dan Lawrence &
Steve Robison, Introducing the Kansas False Claims Act: A Primer, J. KAN. B. Ass'N, Oct. 2010,
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This strategy, however, suffers from a potential drawback. It requires
whistleblowers to refrain from filing their complaint with the DOJ. Instead, a
putative relator and her counsel would have to wait until they compile
sufficient evidence to convince a financier to fund at least part of the litigation.
Such a delay is risky. The FCA's first-to-file provision bars relators from filing
claims if their allegations are substantially similar to those in an earlier
complaint."' Thus, waiting may result in another relator filing first and
disqualifying the whistleblower seeking financing. The pre-filing funding
strategy is therefore most useful to relators who believe other individuals are
unlikely to file a claim. Otherwise, relators and their counsel are better off
seeking financing after filing a complaint with the DOJ.
C. Using Partial Assignment as a Solution Post-Filing
Relators and their counsel face a greater challenge in proving common
interest if they seek funding after filing suit with the DOJ. Nonetheless, the
doctrine of partial assignment may still provide a solution. Unlike contracts,
which ordinarily require consideration to be enforceable, assignments do not
require a quid pro quo in order to be valid. 9 Additionally, should the
assignment be gratuitous, the assignor can freely revoke the assignment up
until the point that the assignee provides some form of "value" in return.220
at 24, 32 ("Communications between a relator and the government or between two relators
made in the prosecution of an FCA suit, designed to further that effort, and not subject to a
waiver, are privileged.").
z16. Hanson v. U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., 3 7 2 F.3d 286, 291-92 (4th Cir. 2004) (finding common
interest where both parties were real parties in interest to the suit).
217. Stanley v. Trinchard, No. 02-cV-1235, 2005 WL 230938 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2005) (holding that
while potential co-plaintiffs might have a common interest, parties with only a financial
interest in the outcome of litigation do not).
218. United States ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co., 710 F. 3 d 171, 176 (4 th Cir. 2013).
zig. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at 102 ("An assignee gives value by taking the assignment
... in exchange for something that would be consideration for a promise."); 29 WELISTON
ON CONTRACTS 5 74:3 (4th ed. 1993) ("[T]he Restatement (Second) of Contracts and courts
that adopt its principles distinguish between assignments backed by consideration and those
which are gratuitous, providing that gratuitous assignments, subject to a number of specific
exceptions, are generally revocable by the assignor." (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS 5 332(2) (1981))); Assignments, supra note 168, 5 70 ("[A]n assignment
unsupported by consideration is revocable unless a writing or delivery shows that it is
irrevocable.").
220. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at ioi. There is an exception to the rule if the revocation
would be unjust because "the assignee has, to his detriment, reasonably relied on the
assignment, and it was for[e]seeable that he would do so." Howard 0. Hunter, Revocability
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This framework provides an opportunity to relators. If a relator wants to
ensure that the ALF entity has an interest in the claim prior to exchanging
privileged information, the relator could make a gratuitous partial assignment
to the financier."' Should the financier decline to fund the case, the relator
would revoke the partial assignment. Should the financier fund the suit, the
relator could revoke the first assignment and enter into a second irrevocable
assignment based on an exchange of "value."
Additionally, it appears that courts will find common interest even where
partial assignments are gratuitous. For example, at least one court has
protected pre-filing communications between relators and the government.
This is significant because the relator's partial assignment is still revocable
during the pre-filing period. Under the FCA's "first-to-file" bar, even if a
potential relator communicates with the government prior to bringing a claim,
that person loses its right to bring suit should another individual file first."
Despite this background, the court held that pre-filing interviews by the DOJ
of the relator were protected by common interest." Thus, if a gratuitous
partial assignment is sufficient to protect communications between the relator
and the government, a gratuitous partial assignment should also protect
communications between a relator and an ALF entity.
of Assignments, in MODERN LAw OF CONTRACTS § 21:6 (2013). However, the relator could
prevent the ALF entity from taking advantage of him or her by well documenting the
circumstances surrounding the assignment and by making it clear that the partial
assignment was freely revocable.
221. It appears that courts and the secondary literature generally agree that gratuitous partial
assignments are freely revocable. See, e.g., 29 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS S 74:46 (4th ed.
1993) (citing Chase Nat. Bank of New York v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948 (1st Cir. 1926)); Note,
Revocability of a Gratuitous Assignment ofPart of a Pecuniary Legacy, 39 HARv. L. REV. 368, 373
(1926). But see Edwin D. Dickinson, Gratuitous Partial Assignments, 31 YALE L.J. 1, 14 (1921)
("If gratuitous declarations of trust are binding, afortiori, it would seem, gratuitous partial
assignments ought to be binding.").
222. See United States ex rel. Purcell v. MWI Corp., 238 F.R.D. 321, 326 (D.D.C. 2oo6).
223. 31 U.S.C. 5 373o(b)(5) (2012) ("When a person brings an action under this subsection, no
person other than the Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts
underlying the pending action."). As this provision demonstrates, merely communicating
with the government about the fraud does not provide sufficient "value" to make the
assignment irrevocable. Thus, assignments are gratuitous until the relator provides the
necessary value: filing a complaint.
224. The decision uses the language of joint-prosecution privilege, which is the same as common
interest privilege. See Katharine Traylor Schaffzin, An Uncertain Privilege: Why the Common
Interest Doctrine Does Not Work and How Uniformity Can Fix It, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 49, 55
(2005) ("Courts identify it by a variety of names, such as the 'common interest privilege' . . .
[and] the 'joint prosecution privilege' .... ).
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If the relator and ALF entity are concerned about the protection offered by
a gratuitous partial assignment, the relator could make an irrevocable
assignment. Instead of granting the funder a full share in the recovery, the
partial assignment would give the ALF entity a marginal percentage of the
relator's claim. In return, the funder would provide some form of value to
make the assignment irrevocable, such as the results of the funders' due
diligence. At that point, the parties would share a common interest in the
litigation (albeit a minimal one).
The "minimal assignment" approach could be criticized for privileging
form over substance. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
strength of an assignee's legal interest does not depend on how much it stands
to recover. For example, in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC Services, Inc.,
the Court held that assignees for collection purposes satisfy Article III standing
requirements, even though the assignees would receive none of the proceeds of
the suit."2 As the Court reasoned, the assignee had "a contractual obligation to
litigate 'in the [assignor's] interest"' and therefore would redress the assignor's
injury.226 Although the respondent in Sprint was a full assignee of the claim,
the Court nonetheless cited Stevens for the proposition that either a full or a
partial assignment would confer standing."
Although Sprint is a decision in a related field of law, its holding is highly
relevant to the privilege dilemma. If a partial assignee has standing because it
shares a common legal interest with the assignor, as suggested by the holding
in Sprint, it follows that the partial assignee's interests are also sufficiently
common as to allow exchange of privileged information. Put another way, it
would be odd to hold that a partial assignee can litigate on behalf of another
(because their interests are common), but that the partial assignee may not
exchange privileged information (because their interests are divergent).
This analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Sprint is not merely
conjectural. The courts in other contexts have held that partial assignments, no
matter how small, are sufficient to create common interest.28 For example, in
Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Woosley, the Tenth Circuit addressed a situation in
which a plaintiff partially assigned his claim against two insurance companies
to nine other parties (to whom he owed debts). The court found that while all
225. 554 U.S. 269, 272-73 (20o8).
226. Id. at 288 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Sprint, 128 S. Ct 2531 (No. 07-552)).
227. Id. at 285.
228. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Woosley, 287 F.2d 531, 533 (ioth Cir. 1961).
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the assignees did not have "an equal interest," they nonetheless had a
"common and undivided interest" in collection of the insurance.2
A partial assignment therefore fills the missing piece in common interest
agreements. Presently, ALF entities are only using the first tool in Sprint-
contracting to align the assignee and assignor's interests. But without the
second tool, a partial assignment, the funder and recipient lack an independent
legal interest to be jointly shared in the first place.
Critics may respond that these strategies suffer from a Catch-22. Financiers
will not fund suits unless they have sufficient evidence of fraud. Relators
cannot obtain sufficient evidence of fraud unless they have money to fund the
suits. Thus it would appear that relators would never have enough evidence to
convince funders to invest in their suits. Nonetheless, qui tam firms are not
without money. In some cases, counsel may be able to cover the full cost of
investigation. Nonetheless, firms may still approach ALF entities for funding
because it can take nearly a decade for a payout. Qui tam counsel could then
use the financier's investment to pay for investigations in other pending
complaints.
In other cases, firms might only be able to pay for part of the litigation. Yet
relator's counsel would still approach a financier with a partially investigated
case. And this investigation may be sufficient. Many of the costs in qui tam
litigation have little to do with developing the underlying facts about the
alleged fraud. 3 o Rather, they stem from tasks such as drafting government
briefs, paying for expert witnesses, supplying clerical work to the government,
screening for privilege, and assessing witness testimony. Of course, financiers
will not have access to evidence from discovery (since this is likely to be the
most significant cost of litigation). Nonetheless, ALF entities regularly fund
litigation prior to discovery. Otherwise, transferring privileged materials would
not be a problem; discovery would be over and so too would the risk of waiver.
Indeed, the DOJ also used to make its intervention decisions before discovery.
The recent practice of outsourcing discovery appears to have more to do with
the agency's limited resources and less with the underlying merits of qui tam
complaints."'
In short, in some instances relator's counsel will run out of resources before
they can convince a financier to invest. However, it appears that in the majority
229. Id.
230. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
231. Supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
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of cases relator's counsel should be able to gather sufficient evidence of fraud in
order to procure funding.
V. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS
As with contracts, an assignment can be void as against public policy."' It
is difficult to predict the policy challenges to ALF-funded qui tam claims given
the lack of literature on the topic. Nonetheless, defendants will face an uphill
battle for a simple reason: courts already permit qui tam plaintiffs to sell their
claims to third parties. These pre-filing releases, described previously in Part
IV, ordinarily involve a relator selling his or her claim to the defendant alleged
of committing fraud."' Since the defendant does not bring suit against itself,
the sale settles the claim.
The courts of appeals have regularly sustained such releases using a fairly
broad test." Such releases are lawful where the government has already
obtained some knowledge of the alleged fraud, whether through corporate
disclosures or any other form of publicly available information."' As the courts
have concluded, the standard protects the public interest in settling disputes,
while at the same time ensuring that the government can pursue its own
investigations.
Defendants will therefore face difficulties invalidating a partial assignment
of a qui tam claim to a litigation financier. The purpose of such an assignment
is to aid a relator in filing a claim with the government, therefore fulfilling the
courts' pre-filing release standard. Moreover, complete sales of qui tam claims
to defendants appear to have a much greater potential for abuse than a partial
sale of a claim to a financier.
This Part therefore addresses four potential public policy challenges that
could survive the pre-filing release standard. These challenges stem from the
unique relationship between ALF entities and relators. Should an ALF entity
invest in a qui tam suit, it would do so through a partial assignment of a partial
assignment -a legal development that appears to be unprecedented. This raises
public policy questions not addressed by the pre-filing release cases.
232. See 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at 77-79; Assignments, supra note 168, § 27 (collecting
cases).
233. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
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A. While Dual Partial Assignments Are an Unprecedented Legal Mechanism,
There Are a Number ofPractical Limitations Preventing Abuse
Because the relator's interest in a qui tam action is a partial assignment, a
contract with an ALF entity would effectuate a partial assignment of a partial
assignment. As previously noted, no court appears to have considered the
validity of such an assignment." Since partial assignments also confer
standing to sue, opponents might argue that multiple partial assignments
allow an unlimited number of unrelated entities to sue a single defendant. The
implications of such unlimited partial assignment could be serious.
First, each of the partial assignees could disavow or attempt to avoid the
binding effect of any judgment entered on the claims. Thus, defendants might
be forced to litigate suits against multiple plaintiffs and engage in costly and
duplicative litigation.
Second, partial assignees may complicate discovery. Third parties who do
not participate in litigation are likely not subject to discovery rules under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."' Thus, difficulties arise should a relator
partially assign its claim to a third party, choose not to sue, and allow the third
party to bring the claim on its own. At that point, the defendant might not be
able to conduct discovery of the original relator.
Third, it is unclear whether defendants could raise counterclaims against
partial assignees. While a defendant might raise counterclaims against the
original relator, the relator does not assign its own liabilities to all the partial
assignees. Thus, it does not appear that a defendant could raise counterclaims
against those potential plaintiffs.
These concerns are not merely theoretical. These are the same arguments
that split the Supreme Court 5-4 in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC
Services, Inc." 9 As previously noted, the majority held that assignees for
collection purposes only (that is, they received none of the proceeds from the
237. The Supreme Court in Stevens found that the "long tradition of qui tam actions," "combined
with the theoretical justification for relator standing ... leaves no room for doubt that a qui
tam relator under the FCA has Article III standing." Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United
States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774, 778 (2000). 'While there is a history of partial
assignments, see Assignments, supra note 168, § 129, and of complete assignments of qui tam
actions, e.g., pre-filing releases, there is no such history of dual partial assignments or
partial assignments of qui tam actions.
238. Cf FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 33-36 (enumerating the responsibilities of"a party" in discovery).
239. 554 U.S. 269, 271 (20o8).
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suit) could satisfy Article III standing requirements.240 Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Roberts filed a vehement dissent. As the Chief Justice opined, "By
severing the right to recover from the right to prosecute a claim, the Court
empower[ed] anyone to bring suit on any claim, whether it be the first
assignee, the second, the third, or so on."' Although a partial assignment does
not similarly sever the right to recover from the right to prosecute, multiple
partial assignments similarly enable anyone to bring suit. Thus, the Chief
Justice's concerns remain.
Despite these concerns, the Chief Justice's opinion only commanded four
votes. By contrast, the majority argued that there are a number of practical
limitations on abusive assignments. First, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provide a mechanism to prevent the fragmentation of legal claims.' Under
Rule 19(a), the court may order a required party to join the case as an
involuntary plaintiff74' Courts regularly use this provision to join partial
assignees as parties and could use the same provision to join ALF entities.'
Second, "a district court can, if appropriate, compel a party to collect and to
produce whatever discovery-related information is necessary."24s Third, with
regard to counterclaims, the court might allow defendants to file a third-party
complaint against the original relator under Rule 14(a).2 6
Nonetheless, Sprint does not close the door completely to future litigation
regarding the validity of multiple partial assignments. The majority made an
important concession that may persuade courts to reject these assignments. As
the Court held, "there has been no allegation that the assignments were made
in bad faith. . . . Were this not so, additional prudential questions might
perhaps arise."' The majority does not define what constitutes bad faith or
what prudential questions may arise. Yet district court judges may latch onto
this line to find multiple partial assignments unlawful.
240. Id. at 273-75.
241. Id. at 302 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
242. Id. at 292 (majority opinion).
243. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2).
z44. 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 154, § 1545 ("In practice, a defendant faced with an action by
only one of the parties to whom the defendant ultimately may be liable may move to join the
absent person in order to avoid the burden of multiple lawsuits.").
245. Sprint Comnc'ns, 554 U.S. at 292 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 30-31, 33-36).
246. Id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a)).
247. Id.
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B. Relators Have an Incentive Not to Complicate DOJ Prosecutions Through
Multiple Partial Assignments
Apart from the potential unfairness to defendants, multiple partial
assignments may interfere with DOJ prosecutions of qui tam claims. The
federal Anti-Assignment Act contextualizes these concerns."' The Act
prohibits plaintiffs from assigning claims against the government to third
parties. A qui tam claim is not one against the government, thus the Act would
not bar a relator from partially assigning her claim. Nonetheless, the rationale
behind the statute might provide courts a reason to invalidate partial
assignments made by relators.
As the courts have long recognized, one purpose for the Anti-Assignment
Act is "to enable the Government to deal only with the original claimant."2 9
That same rationale could prohibit relators from partially assigning their
claims. Once a whistleblower begins to partially assign its suit, the government
would be forced to deal with a host of potential parties with competing goals
and interests. This could complicate the DOJ's efforts to litigate the suit. For
example, relators retain statutory rights to challenge the DOJ in court should
the agency choose to settle or dismiss the action.2 so It is unclear whether partial
assignees would also retain such rights. At the very least, the presence of
multiple partial assignees might increase the probability that the relator would
leak confidential information from the DOJ or decrease transparency about the
relator's motives for bringing the suit.
As before, however, there are prudential limits to these concerns. If a
relator partially assigned its claims to too many entities, the DOJ might simply
decline to intervene or even dismiss the suit. Thus, relators have an incentive
not to excessively fragment their claims.
C. ALF Would Neither Prolong Claims nor Complicate Settlements
Another possible ground for a public policy objection is that a qui tam
relator takes on a quasi-governmental role in prosecuting the claim. 2s1 As a
248. 31 U.S.C. 5 3727 (2012).
249. United States v. Shannon, 342 U.S. 288, 291 (1952) (quoting United States v. Aetna Sur.
Co., 338 U.S. 366, 373 (1949)).
250. 31 U.S.C. 5 3730(c)(2)(B).
251. One of the lead proponents of the False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Representative
Howard Berman, characterized the Act's purpose as to "deputize ready and able people who
have knowledge of fraud against the government to play an active and constructive role
through their counsel to bring to justice those contractors who overcharge the government."
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general rule, a public officer cannot assign unearned salary or fees of his or her
office."' The rule prevents public officers from being deprived of their means
of support, which might impair performance of their services."' Thus, a
defendant might argue that a relator cannot partially assign its claims due to
the risk of impropriety on the relator's part. In particular, defendants would
likely claim that financing incentivizes relators to draw out suits in hope of
gaining larger settlements.
1. Gaining Undue Influence over the Relator
In theory, ALF entities could force relators to hold out for larger
settlements based on the terms of the financing contract. ALF entities have
publicly stated that they are "passive investors" and have "no control over the
litigation whatsoever.""s4 This claim is hard to verify, since funding contracts
are subject to confidentiality agreements.ss Nonetheless, one such contract in a
multi-billion-dollar dispute has recently become public: Burford's funding
agreement with Ecuadorian plaintiffs suing Chevron., 6 The agreement became
public when U.S. District Court Judge Kaplan issued an order for the entire
case file of the plaintiffs' lead attorney, Steven Donziger. Moreover, the
contract casts doubt on the funders' alleged passivity.'
For the purposes of evaluating undue influence, the most relevant contract
terms are those involving settlement.2s 8 There, the contract provides that
Burford will receive multiples of $55 million for every $1 billion in recovery
($55 million, $11o million, and so on). However, if the claimants receive less
than $1 billion but more than about $69.5 million, Burford still gets the $55
million payout. In short, the terms of the contract penalize the claimants if they
settle for less than $1 billion.
The Burford contract may be an anomaly. Then again, ALF entities might
place similar settlement terms in contracts with relators and their counsel.
Should this be the case, the signatories would likely fall under the same
United States ex rel. Truong v. Northrop Corp., 728 F. Supp. 615, 618 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(quoting 132 CONG. REc. H9 388 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman)).
252. 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 167, at 77-79.
253. Id.
254. Banzaca, supra note 85, at 5.
255. Steinitz, supra note 25, at 475-76.
256. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
257. Steinitz, supra note 25, at 471-73.
258. Id. at 467-68.
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pressures to increase the size of settlement. This could unnecessarily prolong
cases and complicate the DOJ's efforts to settle the dispute.
2. Gaining Undue Influence over Counsel
It is further possible that ALF entities could influence counsel to prolong
litigation and pursue larger settlements. As the Burford agreement reveals, ALF
entities do far more during their due diligence than simply evaluate the "fit"
between attorneys and the claims. The Burford contract requires that the
claimants hire "Nominated Lawyers," chosen jointly by the funder and the
claimants.2 s' In Burford's case, the Nominated Lawyer Games Tyrrell) has
close ties to the company's chairman and serves as Burford's counsel in other
matters.260 As Nominated Lawyer, Tyrell has an array of responsibilities,
including a duty to
devote sufficient time and attention[,] . . . provide all . . . material
Documentation[,] ... submit to examination by the [lawyers] for the
preparation of written statements[,] . . . consult with the [lawyers] as
they [prepare to pursue, enforce or settle] the Award[,] . . . appear at
any proceedings or hearings[,] .. . [and] cause all persons related to the
Claim ... to submit to examination by the [lawyers].
The Nominated Lawyer therefore not only exerts some degree of control over
the litigation, but also decides whether to disclose privileged materials to
Burford (by determining whether or not they are "material Documentation").
The Nominated Lawyer must also authorize any payments coming from
Burford's contribution.26 ' Finally, the Nominated Lawyer "can be replaced only
with the 'Funder's approval (which shall not be unreasonably withheld).'2 63
The risks that Nominated Lawyers pose to qui tam claims are therefore
twofold. First, Nominated Lawyers may allow financiers to influence
investigations and potentially interfere with settlement negotiations. As a
matter of policy, courts may be unlikely to enforce such contractual provisions.
Second, the Nominated Lawyers may raise ethical questions under the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A Nominated Lawyer's close ties to a
2S9. Id. at 472.
26o. Id.
261. Id. at 474-75.
262. Id. at 473.
263. Parloff, supra note 21.
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funder may impair his or her ability to give impartial advice. 6 4 Additionally,
the contract's removal provisions may also violate the Model Rules. The
American Bar Association has stated that an agreement permitting an ALF
supplier to have veto power over the selection of counsel may inappropriately
limit the client's right to terminate counsel, in violation of Model Rule
1.16(a)., 6' The Model Rules may therefore pose problems should an ALF entity
seek to use a similar contract in a qui tam claim.
3. Responses to These Concerns of Impropriety
As previously noted, the Burford contract may be an anomaly. The contract
relates to an international dispute involving foreign claims, foreign actors, and
foreign courts. Burford therefore did not anticipate that its contract would see
the inside of an American courtroom.
Qui tam actions, on the other hand, are always subject to DOJ scrutiny. As
a result, it is likely that the DOJ would request funding contracts as part of the
agency's due diligence." Thus, ALF entities are unlikely to include terms
regarding settlement or Nominated Lawyers, lest the DOJ look unkindly on
such provisions.
Additionally, even if ALF entities did include such settlement or
Nominated Lawyers terms in their contracts, it is unlikely that they would have
any substantive impact on the DOJ's litigation. Under the False Claims Act, the
DOJ has primary authority to negotiate settlements with the defendant. 67
While the relator can challenge any resulting settlement in court, judges
generally treat a settlement negotiated by the government with considerable
deference." Additionally, it is unlikely that litigation financing would result in
a greater number of challenges. It is already standard practice for relators to
challenge DOJ settlements, since the relator has little to lose from a court
hearing.26 9 Thus, ALF would likely have little effect on the length of litigation.
264. SEBOK & WENDEL, supra note ii, § IV.A.i. It is still possible for the Nominated Lawyer to
avoid violating the Model Rules by disclosing these conflicts to the client and seeking
informed consent. Id. This appears to be the case in the Burford contract, given the number
of disclosures relating to Tyrrell's relationships and employment.
265. Id.
266. See supra Part II.
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Finally, it is unlikely that defendants could prove that qui tam relators are
per se barred from assigning claims. Since qui tam relators are only partial
assignees of the government's damages claim, they do not inherit all of the
rights and privileges of governmental office.27 o Thus, as quasi-governmental
entities, relators can likely assign their claims as they see fit. The litigation
involving "pre-filing releases" of qui tam claims confirms this outcome.2 7 ' If a
relator can lawfully sell her entire claim, it follows that a relator can also
lawfully sell a portion of her claim.
D. ALF Entities Would Not Encourage Frivolous Suits
Opponents may finally argue that ALF would increase the number of
frivolous qui tam claims. First, third-party financing might lessen the legal
constraints and practical disincentives that prevent whistleblowers from filing
meridess claims. Second, ALF entities may disproportionately fund those cases
declined by the DOJ, which are more likely to be meritless.
1. ALF Entities Are Unlikely to Skew Relators' Incentives to File Suit
The courts have long recognized that the difficult process of bringing a qui
tam suit deters frivolous claims.2 7 ' A false claims plaintiff will usually confront
defendants with significant litigation coffers and access to preeminent legal
talent. Should the suit proceed to trial, the relator frequently must prove a
complex case requiring a substantial investment of time to plead and prove.
Then, even if the relator prevails at trial, there is a strong likelihood of an
270. The majority in Stevens draws this distinction to address one of the dissent's arguments. The
dissent argues that if a relator "act[s] as an assignee of the Federal Government's claim ...
qui tam actions may be brought by relators against the same category of 'persons' that may
be sued by the Attorney General." Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel.
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 796-97 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting). In response, the majority
writes in a footnote that "we are asserting that a qui tam relator is, in effect, suing as a partial
assignee of the United States." Id. at 773 n.4. Therefore, the relator does not have the same
status to sue as the Attorney General and cannot escape the bounds of the Eleventh
Amendment.
271. See supra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
272. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084, 1o91-92 (C.D.
Cal. 1989); see United States ex rel. Kreindler & Kreindler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d
1148, 1154 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Because the qui tam relator: (i) funds the prosecution of the FCA
suit, (2) will receive a private share in the government's recovery only upon prevailing, and




LITIGATION FINANCE IN DOJ WHISTLEBLOWER SUITS
immediate appeal. "Thus, a plaintiffs lawyer in a false claims action, invariably
working on a contingency fee basis, faces enormous practical disincentives to
proceeding with the suit.""73
Additionally, the "practical disincentives" extend beyond the cost of
litigation. Relators often lose well-paying jobs, cannot find alternative
employment, and forfeit employment benefits such as health and life
insurance. 74 While the courts can compensate these losses by increasing the
size of the relator's share, whistleblowers must still endure years of litigation. 7 1
Even then, it is uncertain whether the suit will result in any recovery at all.
ALF participation may therefore skew the incentives for relators and their
counsel to bring suit. Instead of having to wait years for a recovery, the parties
would receive a portion of the payout upfront. As a result, relators can live in
relative comfort prior to the DOJ's intervention decision, and counsel need not
worry about dipping into its own litigation coffers. Thus, ALF participation
may lead to an increase in filings of dubious merit with the DOJ.
The potential ramifications are not merely prudential. Opponents might
argue that ALF participation undermines the statutory framework of the FCA.
Recall that, under the Act, relators receive between fifteen to twenty-five
percent of any payout if the government intervenes, and twenty to thirty
percent if the DOJ declines.7' These percentages are not an accident; as the
courts have long recognized, "[t]he history of the FCA qui tam provisions
demonstrates repeated congressional efforts to walk a fine line between
encouraging whistle-blowing and discouraging opportunistic behavior." 77
Opponents might therefore argue that ALF participation defeats Congress's
intent in passing the FCA by over-incentivizing whistleblowers to bring suit,
and therefore should be void on public policy grounds."
273. Stillwell, 714 F. Supp. at 1092.
274. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson-Pochardt v. Rapid City Reg'1 Hosp., 252 F. Supp. 2d
892, 902 (D.S.D. 2003); see United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Grp., Inc., 171
F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1338 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
275. See Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1340-41.
276. 31 U.S.C. § 37 3 0(d)(1)-(2) (2012).
277. United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. Cir.
1994); accord United States ex rel. Green v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 964 (9 th Cir.
1995); United States ex rel. DeCarlo v. Kiewit/AFC Enters., Inc., 937 F. Supp. 1039, 1046
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
278. See Northrop, 59 F.3d at 958 (opining that courts must first look to Congress's intent in
passing the FCA in order to determine the enforceability of contracts between relators and
third parties).
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Nonetheless, these concerns appear to be overblown for four reasons. First,
relators are already heavily incentivized to bring suits. In recent years, DOJ
awards have been steadily increasing, and several relators have received shares
in the hundreds of millions of dollars.2 7 9  Legal practitioners have
acknowledged that these rewards provide "huge incentives" to file suit and are
increasing the number of complaints filed with the DOJ.28o And prosecutors
have acknowledged that the agency has "received a flood of whistleblower
suits" following the recent payouts.28 ' Thus, as one practitioner has written,
ALF investment is unlikely to affect the number of people coming forward with
cases, as the large payouts probably provide enough incentive to file suit-
independent of what funds might offer."
Second, ALF entities are aware that paying outsized amounts to potential
plaintiffs would lessen claimants' incentives to properly litigate suits. 8 ' For
this reason, financiers ordinarily contribute a relatively low percentage of the
estimated claim value-between five and ten percent.28 4 Thus, ALF support is
less a means for a get-rich-quick scheme, and more a method of tiding
whistleblowers over until the DOJ issues a final award. It is therefore unlikely
that ALF participation would greatly increase the incentives for whistleblowers
to file meritless suits.
Third, even if financiers do incentivize relators to come forward, the
financiers already have a mechanism to screen potentially frivolous suits: the
due diligence process. Since financiers are unlikely to fund these meritless
suits,28s relators have no additional incentive to file a claim with the DOJ.
Moreover, the relators that are incentivized to report based on the prospect of
ALF funding are also the most likely to seek funding prior to filing a claim with
the DOJ. Relators risk significant repercussions to their employment as a result
of filing. And if relators are primarily filing for the upfront payment, they will
seek funding first, not last.
Finally, ALF participation might result infewer cases being filed with the
DOJ. As previously noted, the presence of an ALF entity might serve as a proxy
for merit to, the DOJ, and the agency might intervene more often in ALF-
279. Bentivoglio et al., supra note 61.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Turley, supra note 51.
283. Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J.
65, 1o6 (2010).
284. Banzaca, supra note 85.
285. See supra Part II.
2474
123-2422 2014
LITIGATION FINANCE IN DOJ WHISTLEBLOWER SUITS
backed suits. Should this be the case, all potential relators would have an
incentive to seek outside funding. Thus, when a relator does not receive
outside funding, he or she would have a lesser incentive to file a claim with
the DOJ.
2. ALF Entities Are Unlikely to Disproportionately Fund Meritless Suits
Given the high cost of financing, opponents might argue that relators
would only seek funding when the government declines to intervene in a suit.
At that point, the relator is forced to litigate the action on its own -and bear all
the costs. Assuming that the government primarily makes its decision to
intervene based on the merits, ALF participation in declined actions would
disproportionately further meritless cases." While ALF entities might still
profit because it is cheaper for defendants to settle rather than litigate, the
informational value to the government of ALF resources would be marginal.
This argument suffers from several flaws. First, given the DOJ's policy of
outsourcing litigation to qui tam firms, ALF entities are likely to play a
substantial role in funding relators' pre-intervention investigations (rather than
only declined actions). With the additional resources, relators can present the
government with a full, well-documented, and well-investigated picture of the
fraud and therefore increase the probability that the DOJ will intervene.
Should the agency do so, the relator (and ALF entity) would have minimal
influence over settlement negotiations, as that decision is primarily within the
hands of the DOJ.287 Therefore, ALF entities would not appreciably extend the
litigation process for cases in which the DOJ does intervene.
Second, even if an ALF entity does fund a declined case, this does not mean
that the suit lacks merit. 8 8 As previously noted, the DOJ evaluates several
secondary criteria in deciding whether to intervene. Thus, assuming ALF
entities have an incentive to screen out frivolous cases, they would only take on
those suits that were declined for reasons other than merit.
286. See supra Part II.
2s7. See Engstrom, supra note 75, at 1271-72 ("[T]he FCA aims to mitigate concern about private
overenforcement by granting the Attorney General -and, by further delegation, the DOJ's
Civil Fraud Section-substantial authority to oversee and control qui tam litigation. Thus,
the DOJ may dismiss or settle a qui tam case out from under a private relator, subject only
to a basic fairness hearing.").
z88. This is particularly true if the ALF entity was not involved with the qui tam firm's pre-
intervention investigations. In this scenario, relator's counsel might simply have lacked the
resources to fully investigate and present the suit to the DOJ, resulting in the decision to
decline intervention.
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CONCLUSION
This Note has sought to explore the implications when two fields of law
collide: alternative litigation finance and qui tam. The growth of ALF in qui
tam claims is a recent but expanding trend. To the extent that qui tam
represents the privatization of law, the financing of whistleblower claims by
third parties will likely have serious implications for our prosecutorial system.
As this Note establishes, the participation of ALF entities in qui tam claims can
significantly aid the DOJ in its fight against fraud. The test is whether relators
and their counsel can use the strategies outlined above to establish common
interest with financiers, and ensure that third parties can adequately vet
potential claims.
The potential benefits of ALF, although significant, should not deter
policymakers and relators from also exploring alternative means of funding qui
tam suits. Innovative statutes that mirror the Criminal Justice Act could
provide federal funds for attorneys, experts, and services necessary for the
adequate representation of relators. Similarly, Congress could provide grants to
the many non-profit organizations dedicated to counseling and supporting
whistleblowers during their litigation. Relators could even "crowdfund" their
claims by forming trusts and allowing investors to buy a stake in the entities.
The possibilities are numerous. But ALF can provide a powerful tool in
relators' arsenal along the way.
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